Interpersonal Attachment and Patterns of Ideological Belief

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We examine whether two general dimensions of sociopolitical belief—right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO)—are rooted in insecure psychological attachment. Based on an undergraduate sample (N = 255), we model the relations among attachment styles, general worldviews, RWA, and SDO. A structural equation model indicated that anxious attachment led to RWA but not SDO and that this effect was mediated by the belief that the world is a dangerous place. In contrast, avoidant attachment led to SDO but not RWA, and this effect was mediated by the belief that the world is an uncaring, competitive jungle in which people are motivated to maximize personal utility. We discuss the implications of these findings for the nature and origins of political conservatism.

KEY WORDS: attachment, dual-process model, ideology

Interpersonal Attachment and the Development of Political Ideology

Two broad types of sociopolitical attitudes—right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO)—have emerged as central explanatory constructs in political psychology, predicting a variety of intergroup phenomena (e.g., prejudice, intolerance, nationalism), as well as more overtly political variables like partisanship, policy preferences, and electoral choice (Altemeyer, 1998; Federico & Sidanius, 2002; McFarland, 2005; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Whitley, 1999; Whitley & Lee, 2000). RWA is defined by a constellation of three social attitudes: conventionalism, submission to authority, and aggression against outgroups, which covary to form a highly unitary attitudinal dimension (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; cf. Funke, 2005).
SDO is embedded in a theory of intergroup relations in which societies minimize conflict by creating ideologies that legitimize the hegemony of dominant groups and the oppression of outgroups. Individuals scoring high in SDO prefer group relations to be hierarchical, whereas low scorers prefer equality between groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Some scholars have suggested that RWA and SDO are ideological in nature, rooted in different motivational processes and socialization histories (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). The goal of this study is to further explore the psychological processes underlying RWA and SDO by examining how interpersonal attachment styles—believed to originate early in human development—structure social worldviews and ideological belief.

While originally conceived as dimensions of personality, recent work suggests that RWA and SDO do not assess cross-situational consistencies in behavior as typical trait terms do; instead the items capture “social attitudes and beliefs of a broadly ideological nature” (Duckitt, 2001, p. 42; see also, Stone, Lederer, & Christie, 1993) with direct implications for mass politics. Indeed, RWA and SDO parallel a longstanding empirical distinction between different dimensions of citizens’ political attitudes and values. Beginning with Eysenck’s (1954) two-factor model of radicalism versus conservatism and tough versus tender mindedness, analysts of the structure of political attitudes and values have repeatedly identified a first factor—corresponding roughly to RWA—that entails conformity, social order, and religiousness at one pole and freedom, autonomy, relativism, and permissiveness at the other—and a second factor—corresponding roughly to SDO—that entails power and inequality at one pole and egalitarianism and concern for the disadvantaged at the other (e.g., Braithwaite, 1994; Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1973; Rokeach, 1973; Saucier, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; for a review, see Duckitt, 2001). For instance, a close inspection of the content of the RWA and SDO scales reveals a clear overlap with the orthogonal dimensions identified by Schwartz (1992): i.e., “openness to change versus conservatism” and “self-transcendence versus self-enhancement”, respectively (Altemeyer, 1998; Eysenck, 1954; Middendorp, 1991; Saucier, 2000; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Moreover, RWA and SDO—and the broad value dimensions associated with them—provide a good mapping to two distinct but related dimensions of contemporary issue conflict. Conceptually, RWA is most relevant to attitudes rooted in the “culture war” (e.g., Fiorina, 2006; Hunter, 1991; Shafer & Claggett, 1995; White, 2003), while SDO is most relevant to attitudes about the distribution of economic resources and power.

Altemeyer (1998) has shown that RWA correlates strongly with the value types that anchor the openness to change versus conservatism dimension (conformity, security, traditionalism, self-direction, and hedonism), whereas SDO correlates strongly with values along the self-transcendence versus self-enhancement dimension (power and universalism).
What factors are responsible for producing stable distributions of the dimensions associated with RWA and SDO? One long-held view is that political conservatism satisfies antecedent psychological motives stemming from threat, fear, and uncertainty (e.g., McClosky, 1958; Wilson, 1973; for a review, see Osterreich, 2005). More recently, John Jost and colleagues interpreted variants of political conservatism as products of motivated social cognition grounded in a host of epistemic and existential psychological needs (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). One limitation of this literature is that most extant work pertains specifically to aspects of ideology that have to do with the “openness to change versus conservatism” dimension, whereas there have been few efforts to trace the underpinnings of the power-linked “self-transcendence versus self-enhancement” dimension, or to determine the extent to which the two dimensions have similar psychological origins. The exception is Duckitt (2001; Duckitt et al., 2002), who has recently provided a “dual process” theory of the origins of both dimensions, in which ideological beliefs are rooted in motivational goals that are made cognitively accessible through socialization practices. A significant structural aspect of Duckitt’s theory is that RWA and SDO are determined by qualitatively distinct sets of psychological processes (hence, dual process), associated with different types of parent-child socialization experiences, as well as different personality dispositions, worldviews, and motivational goals.

Consistent with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford’s (1950) original theory, Duckitt (2001) argues that future right-wing authoritarians are subject to rigid and punitive child-rearing practices. This is thought to result in the personality trait of social conformity and a general view of the world as dangerous and threatening (see also Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Feldman, 2003; Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005). On the other hand, SDO is hypothesized to originate in a different type of childhood socialization experience, namely unaffectionate parenting (e.g., a lack of love, generosity, and trust in others), which is thought to result in the personality trait of tough-mindedness, a general view of the world as an uncaring, competitive jungle where people are bound by a “ruthless, amoral struggle for resources and power in which might is right, and winning everything” (Duckitt, 2001, p. 51), and the motivational goal of obtaining power and control over others. In sum, Duckitt’s model posits that socialization patterns (rigid or unaffectionate childrearing) promote the formation of personality traits (a preference for tough versus tender-mindedness; social conformity versus personal autonomy), in turn leading to the endorsement of worldviews (competitive-jungle or dangerous-world beliefs), and ultimately ideology (RWA or SDO; Duckitt, 2001).

2 The two sets of processes—one for RWA and one for SDO—appear virtually independent of one another (Duckitt, 2001). Thus, for example, strict socialization predicted the trait of social conformity but not tough mindedness, whereas unaffectionate socialization predicted tough mindedness but not social conformity; a dangerous worldview predicted RWA but not SDO and a competitive worldview predicted SDO but not RWA.
In this research we examine how attachment styles structure social worldviews and ideology. To do this, we combine Duckitt’s (2001) framework with insights derived from attachment theory, an evolutionary-developmental theory of personality describing the conditions in which people seek the physical and emotional proximity of others when exposed to environmental threats (Bowlby, 1969/1982). The attachment system is believed to hinge on beliefs that caregivers, and later, intimate partners, will be readily accessible in times of need and distress. The conceptual power of the theory is that patterns of child-rearing early in development affect interpersonal beliefs and expectancies throughout the lifespan (Ainsworth, 1991; Bowlby, 1969/1982; Fraley, 2002). As such, a robust literature has emerged suggesting that the attachment system shapes perceptions of the social environment, from the availability of intimate partners and caregivers to hostile reactions towards outgroups (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). In this study we examine whether ideological processes may also be rooted in this fundamental system governing many human relations.

An Attachment Theory of Ideology

The primary goal of attachment behavior is the alleviation of anxiety and an enduring sense of felt security (Sroufe & Waters, 1977). The attachment system emerges in early infancy in the context of the caregiver-child relationship and is activated throughout the lifespan as individuals encounter threat and seek the protective proximity of others. The success of early attachment experiences establishes the individual’s stable attachment style, a basic “internal working model” of interpersonal relationships and ways of coping with distress. When proximity-seeking efforts are met by caring, responsive others, anxiety is relieved, facilitating exploration of the world and the development of the individual’s personality and capacities (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). Repeated episodes of successful attachment behavior give rise to a secure attachment style, marked by self-confidence, empathy, and trust, and most important for our purposes, the belief that the world is a safe, harmonious place “populated by people of good will” (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, p. 62; see also Brennan & Shaver, 1995; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001).

When proximity-seeking attempts are not met by emotionally available attachment figures, however, the goal of the attachment system (i.e., alleviation of distress) is thwarted. According to Mikulincer and Shaver (2003), under these circumstances, “the distress originally elicited by the encounter with threats is now compounded by serious doubts that safety can be attained, that the world is a safe place, that others can be trusted, and that the self has the resources necessary to manage stress” (p. 62). Repeated episodes of nonsuccessful attachment behavior are hypothesized to result in one of two insecure attachment styles, depending on the compensatory strategy used to reduce threat. According to attachment theorists
(e.g., Ainsworth et al., 1978; Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; Main, 1990), these strategies involve either hyperactivation or deactivation of the attachment system. On one hand, the former is associated with an *anxious* attachment style, in which the individual becomes highly preoccupied with protective proximity-seeking, and constantly monitors the environment for the availability of emotional support. On the other hand, the latter is associated with an *avoidant* attachment style, in which the individual does not believe successful proximity-seeking is viable at all and becomes emotionally distant from attachment figures, preferring to rely solely on the self to manage threat and restore emotional equanimity.³

According to Bowlby’s original theory of attachment (1969/1982, 1973), children internalize the quality of attachment experiences such that they become both a prototype for relationships in adulthood and a foundation for the development of more generalized views of the social world. Accordingly, adults’ orientations toward proximity-seeking can also be understood in terms of the basic categories of attachment theory. Current work situates adult attachment styles in terms of the intersection between two distinct *attachment dimensions*, namely, relational anxiety and avoidance (Brennan et al., 1998). *Anxiety* refers to the degree by which the individual feels a heightened state of arousal and a general preoccupation with close relationships; whereas *avoidance* refers to emotional distancing and discomfort in close relationships. Thus, one’s overall or *chronic* attachment pattern is understood in terms of one’s level of general anxiety and avoidance with regard to relationships (Brennan et al., 1998). For example, a securely attached adult would demonstrate little preoccupation with abandonment and demonstrate greater trust in intimate partners (e.g., low anxiety) while also feeling optimistic about close relationships and seeking relational closeness and intimacy (e.g., low avoidance: Pietromonaco & Carnelley, 1994). Further research also suggests that attachment beliefs are an integral part of intimate partner interactions (e.g., feelings of jealousy, trust, and communication; Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994) and that processes of mate selection tend to be affected by attachment orientation (Collins & Read, 1990; Fraley & Waller, 1998; Pietromonaco & Carenelley, 1994).

As attachment experiences can provide a rich store of information about what people are like and how they are likely to behave, differences in attachment style are likely to be an important component in the development of general worldviews. In particular, the two dimensions of adult attachment are linked to cognitive and motivational differences that might also facilitate the adoption of worldviews related to RWA (i.e., the world is dangerous) and SDO (i.e., the world is a

³ From a development perspective, anxious attachment is the result of inconsistent and incompetent parenting, whereas avoidant attachment is the result of dismissive and rejecting parenting (Ainsworth et al., 1978). With respect to attachment in adulthood, the anxious style is based on the belief that security can be attained only through intensified and vigilant proximity-seeking efforts, and the avoidant style from the belief that attachment-seeking efforts are not viable (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).
competitive jungle). For example, several studies have reported that securely attached individuals view intimacy as the primary goal of interpersonal relationships, whereas security and control over others are the primary goals for individuals high in anxiety and avoidance, respectively (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer, 1998). Securely attached children exhibit greater cognitive complexity and openness to new information than those with anxious or avoidant attachment styles (Cassidy, 1986), and securely attached adults are more tolerant of ambiguity and disorder, less dogmatic, lower in the need for cognitive closure, and less reliant on ethnic stereotypes than individuals high in attachment avoidance and anxiety (Mikulincer, 1997). Moreover, Mikulincer and Shaver (2003) found that attachment avoidance (but not anxiety) was inversely related to support for the values of universalism and benevolence (i.e., concern for the well-being of all people and close others, respectively) that anchor the self-transcendence pole of the value dimension identified by Schwartz (1992). Finally, activating secure attachment experimentally through subliminal priming has been shown to decrease intergroup bias, mitigate the effect of mortality salience on the denigration of moral transgressors (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000), and heighten support for the values of universalism and benevolence (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).

Taken together, these previous findings suggest a number of hypotheses about the relationship between attachment anxiety and avoidance, worldviews, and the general ideological dimensions represented by RWA and SDO. On one hand, individuals who are high in attachment anxiety are easily threatened, intolerant of ambiguity and dogmatic, high in the need for closure, and view security (rather than intimacy) as the primary relationship goal (Berant, Mikulincer, & Florian, 2001; for a review, see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). These individuals also tend to have negative views of the self and experience self-doubt in their ability to cope with threat (e.g., Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). They are thus likely to see the world as a dangerous and threatening place and should strive for the goals of conformity, tradition, security, and social control. Therefore, via dangerous-world perceptions, high levels of attachment anxiety should be associated with high RWA. On the other hand, individuals who are high in attachment avoidance lack interpersonal warmth and trust, are highly self-reliant, and view control over others as the primary goal in interpersonal relationships. These individuals are likely to become tough minded and to adopt social attitudes related to power, distrust, and cynicism, giving rise to the belief that the world is an uncaring competitive jungle. Therefore, via perceptions of the world as a competitive jungle, high levels of attachment avoidance should be associated with high SDO.

**Consequences for Left-Right Self-Placement**

In turn, the attachment-related processes we describe here may have significance beyond the specific dimensions of ideological belief represented by RWA and SDO. In particular, most forms of political participation at least implicitly
require citizens to place themselves somewhere along a general left-right continuum: that is, the preferences associated with positions on multiple dimensions like RWA and SDO must be mapped onto a single left-right dimension when it comes time to identify with one party or the other or favor generally liberal or generally conservative candidates (Converse, 1964; Kinder, 1998). Given the centrality of this general left-right dimension to the organization of political attitudes and behavior, it is worth asking how each of the attachment-related pathways analyzed here might impinge on it. Prior research indicates that both RWA (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998) and SDO (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) are consistently related to generalized “left-right” predispositions like liberalism-conservatism and partisanship, suggesting that the attachment-related processes behind each ideological dimension may also have an indirect effect on left-right identification.

Therefore, we expect (1) that both RWA and SDO will be associated with a stronger tilt to the right and (2) that both anxiety and avoidance will have indirect effects on left-right self-placement via the dangerous-world/RWA and competitive-jungle/SDO pathways, respectively. However, it is something of an open question as to which of these processes should ultimately have the strongest impact on left-right self-placement. In general, we argue that this should depend on the extent to which the set of concerns associated with each construct are primed by elite debate, i.e., made to seem more important and politically relevant via frequent and prominent discussion (Miller & Krosnick, 2000; see also Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). If elite discourse raises issues associated with social cohesion and stability, then we would expect the anxiety-based pathway involving dangerous-world perceptions and RWA to have a greater impact; but if elite discourse focuses mainly on issues associated with competition over power and economic resources, we would expect the avoidance-related pathway involving competitive-jungle perceptions and SDO to have a greater impact. Unfortunately, students of public opinion are not agreed on which of these domains is more consistently primed by current discourse. On one hand, many accounts suggest that the “social issues” agenda linked to the anxiety-related pathway—the substance of the “culture war”—is currently ascendant (for a review, see Fiorina, 2006; see also Frank, 2004; Hunter, 1991; Kaufmann, 2002; Layman, 2001; Treier & Hillygus, 2005). On the other hand, several analyses suggest that the traditional “class-based” agenda linked to the avoidance-related pathway remains no less central than the social-issues agenda to both political discourse and the mass public’s vote decisions (Bartels, 2005; Fiorina, 2006; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 1997). Therefore, in this study, we approach the question of how left-right self-placement is affected by the two pathways from a largely exploratory perspective.

**Overview and Hypotheses**

Attachment experiences provide a developmentally based cognitive and emotional framework for relating to the world. In this study, we test whether these
frameworks extend to the realm of political attitudes. We test the following specific hypotheses about relations between the dimensions of attachment style, worldviews, and ideological beliefs (RWA and SDO):

(1) The different dimensions of attachment style should be directly related to worldviews. Attachment anxiety should be related to the general belief that the world is dangerous and threatening, and attachment avoidance should be related to the general belief that the world is a competitive jungle.

(2) The effects of the two attachment dimensions on ideological beliefs should be largely indirect, mediated by worldviews. Thus, anxiety should have an indirect effect on RWA via dangerous-world perceptions, while avoidance should have an indirect effect on SDO via competitive-jungle perceptions.

(3) The two sets of processes should be largely independent: Attachment anxiety should not predict competitive-jungle worldviews, and attachment avoidance should not predict dangerous worldviews. By extension, anxiety should not have an indirect effect on SDO, and avoidance should not have an indirect effect on RWA.

To test these hypotheses, we estimated structural equation models in which the anxiety and avoidance dimensions of attachment were specified as indirect causes of RWA and SDO via dangerous-world and competitive-jungle perceptions, respectively. Moreover, in a second analysis, we explore the question of which pathway—the anxiety-linked “openness versus conservatism” pathway or the avoidance-linked “self-transcendence versus self-enhancement” pathway—has the strongest impact on individuals’ overall self-placement on the left-right political continuum.

**Methods and Data**

Data were collected from 255 undergraduates at a northeastern state university; 135 were males and 120 were females. Approximately 38% were White, 34% were Asian American, 13% were African American, 1% were Native American, 6% were Hispanic, and 8% of the sample did not reveal an ethnic background. Since much of the survey consisted of revealing sensitive information about close relationships, upon arrival at our survey lab, we asked that participants complete the survey at individual desks divided by separators. Participants completed the survey privately and were assured that all data were to be kept private and confidential.

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4 The median age of participants was 21 years. Approximately 14% were college freshmen, 15% were sophomores, 44% were juniors, 20% were fourth-year seniors, and 7% were fifth-year and greater seniors.
After securing informed consent, participants were then instructed that they would be participating in a study intended to assess interpersonal and social attitudes. Each participant then completed a battery of questions intended to measure interpersonal attachment. The first series of questions consisted of a 36-item measure developed and validated by Brennan et al. (1998), where half of the questions measured relational anxiety—e.g., “I worry about being alone,” “I worry about being abandoned,” “I get frustrated when my partner is not available in times of need”—and the remaining half assessed relational avoidance—e.g., “I try to avoid getting too close to my partner,” “I am nervous when partners get too close to me,” “I get uncomfortable when my partner wants to be close.” The anxiety and avoidance items were presented in alternating format to participants, rather than as separate blocks, and asked on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Both scales were highly reliable ($\alpha_{\text{anxiety}} = .90$ and $\alpha_{\text{avoidance}} = .92$).

After completing the attachment battery, participants were asked to complete a series of questions intended to measure their “beliefs on a wide range of political and social attitudes.” We first asked them to complete a shortened 12-item version of the RWA scale (see Altemeyer, 1996) ($\alpha = .72$), followed by an 8-item version of Sidanius and Pratto’s sixth version of the SDO scale ($\alpha = .83$). We next measured a general threat orientation using Altemeyer’s (1998) Belief in a Dangerous World Scale ($\alpha = .73$; e.g., “Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us . . .”, “It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer respectable people and more and more persons with no morals at all threaten everyone else.”), followed by Duckitt’s (2001) Competitive-Jungle Scale ($\alpha = .84$; e.g., “Money, wealth, and luxury are what really count in life,” “Winning is not the first thing; it’s the only thing.”). Each item was asked on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). At the end of the survey, participants were asked to their party identification and ideological placement on a 7-point scale where high scores denote Republican, conservative leanings, respectively. All items used in the analysis are presented in the appendix.

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5 Following this section we included an experimental manipulation intended to “prime” attachment styles by having participants either envision a “secure event” (e.g., “Imagine a time in which you felt distressed and were surrounded by caring people.”), an “insecure event” (e.g., “Imagine a time in which you were distressed and were surrounded by uncaring people.”), or a “control event” (e.g., “Imagine yourself shopping in a grocery store.”). This manipulation did not have a significant effect on any of the post manipulation variables in this study, and it did not moderate any of the key relationships between the variables in our model. For this reason we only include it in a footnote.

6 Participants also completed a series of questions pertaining to policy issues and nine questions derived from Smith, Murphy, and Coats’s (1999) measure of group anxiety. As they are not relevant to our hypotheses, these items are excluded from the analyses presented below.

7 We intentionally asked questions in this way so as to rule out the possibility of order effects in our analyses. Since RWA and SDO were always asked before the worldview items, our findings cannot be explained by question order.
Table 1 presents the zero-order correlations among the six full measures. Several patterns stand out among these coefficients. First, the relevant “pairs” of constructs from each portion of our model (i.e., anxiety and avoidance, dangerous-world and competitive-jungle perceptions, and RWA and SDO) are only slightly correlated (with rs ranging from .22 to .29), suggesting that they are not simply redundant with one another. Second, as predicted, anxiety was more strongly correlated with dangerous-world perceptions, while avoidance was more strongly correlated with competitive-jungle perceptions. Third, replicating Duckitt’s (2001) findings, dangerous-world perceptions correlated more strongly with RWA, while competitive-jungle perceptions correlated more highly with SDO.

Attachment Style, Worldviews, and Ideology

To test our hypotheses more thoroughly, we used LISREL (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996) to estimate a structural-equation model with latent variables corresponding to each of our key constructs. To define each of the six latent variables, items for the relevant construct were used to construct “item parcels.” These parcels were created by averaging subsets of items for each construct together to obtain a smaller number of composite indicators. The individual items were combined into parcels to simplify the measurement models and to avoid the problems introduced by nonnormality in the individual items (see Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Three parcels were created for each variable; these were then used as the observed-variable indicators for each latent variable. The actual structural model was then specified with anxiety and avoidance as exogenous variables and dangerous-world perceptions, competitive-jungle

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### Table 1. Zero Order Correlation Matrix for Anxiety, Avoidance, Competitive Jungle (CJ), Dangerous World (DW), RWA, and SDO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anxiety</th>
<th>Avoidance</th>
<th>DW</th>
<th>CJ</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>SDO</th>
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<td>Anxiety</td>
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<td>Avoidance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.10#</td>
<td>–.15*</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>26***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.29***</td>
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#p < .10
*p < .05
***p < .001
world perceptions, RWA, and SDO as endogenous variables. In the model, anxiety and avoidance were each allowed to have direct effects on dangerous-world and competitive-jungle-world perceptions. In turn, dangerous-world perceptions were allowed to have a direct effect on RWA and competitive-jungle-world perceptions were allowed to have a direct effect on SDO.9 Three covariances were also specified, between (1) anxiety and avoidance, (2) the disturbances for dangerous-world and competitive-jungle-world perceptions, and (3) the disturbances for RWA and SDO.10 Once these specifications were made, the model was estimated using the maximum-likelihood method.

The estimates for this model are shown in Figure 1; latent-variable correlations and standardized estimates for the structural coefficients are given in italics in parentheses. On the whole, the model provided a decent fit to the data. While the sample size was large enough to generate a significant chi-square, $\chi^2(124) = 249.46$, $p < .001$, Bentler’s comparative fit index (CFI) and the root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) indicated a reasonable fit, with CFI = .95 and RMSEA = .065 (see Hu & Bentler, 1995).11 Moreover, the chi-square to degrees-of-freedom ratio for the model was less than 3 (i.e., $\chi^2/df = 2.01$), indicating a reasonable fit (see Kline, 1998).

Looking at the relationships between the attachment variables and worldviews, we find a pattern consistent with our expectations. As hypothesized, anxiety had a significant direct effect on dangerous-world perceptions (standardized $\gamma = .33$, $p < .01$), but not competitive-jungle-world perceptions (standardized $\gamma = .05$, $p > .20$). Conversely, avoidance had a significant direct effect on competitive-jungle-world perceptions (standardized $\gamma = .23$, $p < .01$), but not dangerous-world perceptions (standardized $\gamma = -.12$, $p > .20$). Confirming this pattern of results, fixing the paths connecting (1) anxiety with dangerous-world

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9 This specification is consistent with Duckitt’s (2001) findings regarding the relationship between worldviews and ideologies. Nevertheless, Lagrange multiplier tests indicated that freeing the direct path from competitive-jungle perceptions to RWA would improve the fit of the model, $\Delta \chi^2(1) = 5.89$, $p < .01$. When the direct paths from competitive-jungle perceptions to RWA and from dangerous-world perceptions to SDO were freed in an additional model, the former reached significance (standardized $\beta = .20$, $p < .01$) but the latter did not (standardized $\beta = -.09$, $p < .20$). Thus, vis-à-vis RWA, both worldviews had significant predictive power. While this pattern of findings is not as clear as Duckitt’s (2001), the standardized effects still indicated that dangerous-world perceptions were more than two times more powerful than competitive-jungle perceptions as a predictor of RWA (i.e., .45 versus .20), confirming Duckitt’s prediction about the relative importance of the two worldviews as predictors of RWA. More importantly, adding these two paths to the full model did not substantively change the key findings (1) that anxiety and avoidance were differentially predictive of dangerous-world and competitive-jungle perceptions, respectively; and (2) that anxiety and avoidance had differential indirect effects on RWA and SDO, respectively, via these two worldviews. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, these two additional paths were left fixed to zero in the main model.

10 Two covariances between error terms were also specified: (1) between the first- and second-item parcels for the latent variable corresponding to avoidance and (2) between the first- and second-item parcels for the latent variable corresponding to dangerous-world perceptions.

11 The 90% confidence interval for the model’s RMSEA was bounded by .053 and .076.
perceptions and (2) avoidance with competitive-jungle perceptions to zero produced a highly significant decline in model fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 29.77$, $p < .001$, while fixing the paths connecting (1) anxiety with competitive-jungle perceptions and (2) avoidance with dangerous-world perceptions to zero did not, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 2.54$, $p > .20$. In other words, the model’s fit is worsened by removal of the anxiety/dangerous-world and avoidance/competitive-jungle paths, but not by removal of the theoretically irrelevant anxiety/competitive-jungle and avoidance/dangerous-world paths. Consistent with the correlations in Table 1, anxiety and avoidance were also interrelated (standardized $\varphi = .40$, $p < .001$). Finally, consistent with earlier work (e.g., Duckitt et al., 2002), dangerous-world beliefs had a significant direct effect on RWA (standardized $\beta = .54$, $p < .001$) and competitive-jungle world perceptions had a significant direct effect on SDO (standardized $\beta = .77$, $p < .001$).

However, our key hypothesis was that the relationship between anxiety and RWA would be mediated by dangerous-world beliefs, while the relationship of SDO and avoidance would be mediated by competitive-jungle beliefs. We examined this hypothesis by looking at the indirect effects of each attachment dimension on RWA and SDO, which are provided by LISREL. These estimates indicated

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**Figure 1.** Dangerous-world and competitive-world perceptions as mediators of the relationships between attachment orientations and RWA and SDO; $\chi^2 (124) = 249.46$, $p < .001$; RMSEA = .065; CFI = .95. Latent variable correlations and standardized estimates for the structural coefficients are given in italics in parentheses.

*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001

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that anxiety had an indirect effect on RWA via dangerous-world perceptions ($IE = .12; \text{standardized } IE = .18; p < .001$), but no indirect effect on SDO via competitive-jungle-world perceptions ($IE = .04; \text{standardized } IE = .04; p > .10$). Conversely, avoidance had an indirect effect on SDO via competitive-jungle-world perceptions ($IE = .22; \text{standardized } IE = .18; p < .01$), but no indirect effect on RWA via dangerous-world perceptions ($IE > -.05; \text{standardized } IE > -.07; p > .10$).\(^\text{12}\)

**Attachment as a Consequence of Worldviews: An Alternative Model**

While the relationships summarized by our structural-equation model receive support from the data, other hypotheses about the relationships between attachment, worldviews, and ideology can be plausibly offered. For example, one alternative is consistent with Duckitt’s (2001) argument that particular worldviews (i.e., dangerous-world perceptions and competitive-jungle perceptions) are prior to ideologies (i.e., RWA and SDO), but suggests that the relationship between the two is mediated by corresponding attachment orientations. According to this account, the perceptions of interpersonal relations represented by the attachment dimensions might be inferred from the worldviews people hold at any given time, leading in turn to certain ideological beliefs. Rather than seeing the attachment dimensions as totally exogenous, this alternative model would account for the possibility that individuals’ attachment-related “working models” can be revised on the basis of current information and experiences with the social world (e.g., Davila & Cobb, 2004). This possibility was explored using a second structural-equation model. The estimates for this model indicated that dangerous-world and competitive-jungle perceptions were related to the attachment dimensions in the appropriate fashion, although the effect of dangerous-world perceptions on anxiety failed to reach significance ($p > .10$). Moreover, the model revealed significant effects of anxiety and avoidance on RWA and SDO, respectively (i.e., standardized $\beta = .27$, and standardized $\beta = .32$; both $ps < .001$). Standard fit indices indicated that the model provided a less-than-adequate fit, i.e., $\chi^2 (124) = 424.82$, $p < .001$, with CFI = .88 and RMSEA = .086.\(^\text{13}\) Also, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)—

\(^{12}\) Lagrange multiplier tests indicated that freeing the direct path from avoidance to SDO would improve the fit of the model, $\Delta \chi^2 (1) = 7.22$, $p < .01$. Accordingly, a slightly modified version of this basic model—which freed direct paths from anxiety to RWA and from avoidance to SDO—was also estimated. In this model, the latter path reached significance (standardized $\gamma = -.17, p < .01$) but the former did not (standardized $\gamma > -.06, p < .20$). However, freeing these additional paths did not change our key results: (1) anxiety and avoidance continued to relate differentially to dangerous-world and competitive-jungle perceptions, respectively; (2) anxiety continued to have a positive indirect effect on RWA (but not SDO) via dangerous-world perceptions; and (3) avoidance continued to have a positive indirect effect on SDO (but not RWA) via competitive-jungle perceptions. Hence, we left these paths fixed to zero in the main model for the sake of parsimony and ease of presentation.

\(^{13}\) The 90% confidence interval for the alternative model’s RMSEA was bounded by .075 and .096.
which is most appropriate for ranking the relative fit of nonnested models (Kline, 1998)—indicated that the fit of this model was worse than the fit of the model implied by our hypotheses (i.e., AIC = 450.92 versus AIC = 350.21; smaller values indicate a better fit). The difference between these two fit statistics (ΔAIC = 100.71) was far greater than 10, the conventional threshold for a “reasonably” superior model fit (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). Thus, our model appears to outperform this alternative.  

Consequences for Overall Left-Right Self-Placement

Thus, the model suggested by our hypotheses appears to fit the data well. As our hypotheses suggested, anxiety and avoidance are differentially related to RWA and SDO via unique sets of perceptions about the nature of social reality. But what are the consequences of each of these processes for individuals’ overall self-placement on the left-right continuum? Does left-right self-placement owe more to the openness versus conservatism dimension linked to anxiety or more to the self-transcendence versus self-enhancement dimension linked to avoidance? In order to explore this question, we estimated a second structural-equation model. This model was identical to the one shown in Figure 1, with one exception: a fifth endogenous latent variable corresponding to left-right self-placement was added. Two single-item indicators were used to define this latent variable: (1) liberal-conservative self-placement and (2) party identification. In the model, both RWA and SDO were allowed to have direct effects on left-right self-placement; no other

14 Another possibility is that anxiety and avoidance may lead directly to RWA and SDO, respectively, which may in turn lead dangerous-world and competitive-jungle perceptions. According to this account, anxiety and avoidance still have the same general consequences for peoples’ attitudes and beliefs; however, rather than seeing particular worldviews as a precondition for emergence of ideological orientations, this model sees them as consequences of those orientations—contrary to Duckitt’s (2001) arguments about the relationship between worldviews and ideologies. In order to address this possibility, we estimated a third model based on this reasoning. In this model, anxiety and avoidance were related in the appropriate fashion to RWA and SDO, respectively (although the second relationship was not significant), while RWA and SDO were significantly related to dangerous-world perceptions and competitive-jungle perceptions, respectively. Nevertheless, the overall fit of the model was weaker. Although standard fit indices indicated that the model provided an adequate fit (CFI = .95; RMSEA = .068, with a confidence interval ranging from .057 to .079), the AIC indicated that the fit of this model was worse than the fit of the model implied by our hypotheses (i.e., AIC = 364.43 versus AIC = 350.21). The difference between these two fit statistics (ΔAIC = 14.22) was again greater than 10.

15 The historical heterogeneity of the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States may lead some readers to question why ideology and partisanship were used as indicators of the same underlying construct. While this is a valid historical concern, recent work indicates that ideology and partisanship have become increasingly aligned (Jacobson, 2000; Layman & Carsey, 2002), with liberals gravitating more uniformly to the Democratic Party and conservatives gravitating more to the GOP. Consistent with this story, the ideology and partisanship indicators were strongly correlated in our data (i.e., r = .57, p < .0001; α = .71, when the two items are put together as a scale). Therefore, it seems reasonable to use both of these measures as indicators of a common left-right construct.
paths involving left-right self-placement were specified. Maximum-likelihood estimation was again used for the analysis.

The estimates for this model are shown in Figure 2. As before, the model fit the data. While the large sample size again produced a significant chi-square, $\chi^2 (157) = 300.14, p < .001$, the comparative fit index, the RMSEA, and the chi-square to degrees-of-freedom ratio all indicated a reasonable fit (CFI = .95; RMSEA = .062; $\chi^2/df = 1.91$). In turn, the unstandardized parameter estimates indicated that both RWA ($\beta = .59, p < .001$) and SDO ($\beta = .23, p < .001$) were significantly related to greater right-wing political identification. However, examination of the standardized betas for these two parameters indicated that RWA had a much stronger effect (i.e., .49 vs. .28). Consistent with this observation, an additional model run constraining these two paths to equality produced a significant decline in model fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (1) = 7.92, p < .01$. The model estimates also indicated that dangerous-world perceptions had a significant indirect effect on left-right self-placement via RWA ($IE = .58$; standardized $IE = .25; p < .001$) and that competitive-jungle-world perceptions had a significant effect on left-right self

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16 One additional error covariance was specified in this model, between the error terms for liberalism-conservatism and party identification.

17 The 90% confidence interval for this model’s RMSEA was bounded by .052 and .072.
placement via SDO (\(IE = .22;\) standardized \(IE = .21; \ p < .001\)). Finally, while attachment anxiety did have a significant indirect effect on left-right self-placement via the dangerous-world/RWA pathway (\(IE = .08;\) standardized \(IE = .10; \ p < .01\)), attachment avoidance did not have a significant indirect effect on left-right self-placement via the competitive-jungle/SDO pathway (\(IE > .02;\) standardized \(IE > .02; \ p < 10\)). Thus, while the data provide evidence for the importance of both pathways, they also suggest that the “openness versus conservatism” pathway linking attachment anxiety to dangerous-world perceptions and RWA may be more consequential for individuals’ overall left-right self-placement in the present context.

**Discussion**

The hypothesis that the endorsement of political ideologies may be rooted in personality has been of longstanding interest to social and political psychologists (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Fromm, 1941; Jost et al., 2003). A common theme in this research is that political orientation can be traced to early child-rearing experiences. For example, Adorno et al. (1950) argued that authoritarianism is the product of a punitive parenting style, leading to the repression of hostility and the displacement of aggression onto socially sanctioned outgroups. More recently, Duckitt (2001) argued that different types of socialization experiences are relevant to different dimensions of ideological belief. He finds that right-wing authoritarianism—and a related syndrome of social conformity, traditionalism, and concern for social order—is linked to strict parenting; whereas social dominance orientation—and a corresponding syndrome of anti-egalitarianism and power seeking—is linked to neglectful, unaffecting parenting. Our primary goal in this research was to better understand the developmental and interpersonal processes that underlie different forms of political ideology. As such, our research is not so much situated in what types of developmental environments promote ideological belief (e.g., an unaffecting or rigid care-giving environment), as much as how the interpersonal expectancies emerging from these environments structure beliefs about the social and political world. To examine this, we combine Duckitt’s dual process framework with insights from attachment theory.

According to attachment theory, people seek the protective security of others when exposed to threat from the environment (e.g., Bowlby, 1969/1982; Sroufe & Waters, 1977). Depending on the cumulative success of attachment experiences, individuals develop a stable attachment style marked either by security, trust, and warmth, or by one of two compensatory traits: anxiety or avoidance (Fraley, 2002). These styles are then believed to affect interpersonal interactions throughout development. In this research we attempt to advance one of Bowlby’s seminal insights, one that has been subject to far less empirical examination: namely, that attachment styles lay the foundation for the development of generalized views of the social world, including those embodied in political ideologies. Attachment
anxiety is linked to a desire for security (versus intimacy) in relationships, as well as to dogmatism and need for cognitive closure (e.g., Berant, Mikulincer, & Florian, 2001). We thus hypothesized that individuals with an anxious attachment style would perceive the world as dangerous and threatening and would in turn endorse the social and cultural aspects of conservatism—in the form of RWA—in order to reduce threat. In contrast, attachment avoidance is marked by interpersonal distrust and by the desire to control others. We thus hypothesized that individuals with an avoidant attachment style would tend to see the world as an uncaring, competitive jungle in which people maximize personal utility and would in turn endorse the economic aspects of conservatism—in the form of SDO—in order to exert control. Finally, we expected the ideological consequences of attachment anxiety and avoidance to be largely independent of one another. Specifically, we did not expect attachment anxiety to have implications for the ideological pathway involving competitive-jungle beliefs and SDO or attachment avoidance to have implications for the ideological pathway involving dangerous-world beliefs and RWA.

In our analyses, a structural equation model based on these hypotheses demonstrated a good fit to the pattern of covariance among attachment styles, worldviews, and ideological beliefs. Attachment anxiety exerted a significant direct effect on dangerous-world beliefs but not on competitive-jungle beliefs, and attachment avoidance exerted a significant direct effect on competitive-jungle beliefs but not on dangerous-world beliefs. Moreover, anxiety exerted a significant indirect effect on RWA through dangerous-world beliefs, and avoidance exerted a significant indirect effect on SDO through competitive-jungle beliefs.

We also tested a number of plausible alternative accounts of the relationships among attachment, worldview, and ideological variables. For example, perceptions and beliefs about interpersonal relations—implied by the attachment style variables—could be based on generalized views of the world. Thus, perceiving the world as full of threat and danger might induce the insecurity and emotional preoccupation associated with anxious attachment, whereas perceiving the world in terms of cut-throat competition for scarce resources might lead to the emotional withdrawal, self-reliance, and interpersonal distrust characterized by avoidant attachment. An alternative model provided little support for this hypothesis.

Finally, an additional analysis indicated that the ideological pathway linking anxiety, dangerous-world perceptions, and RWA had a stronger impact on overall left-right self-placement than the pathway linking avoidance, competitive-jungle perceptions, and SDO. This result confirms current theoretical and empirical suggestions that contemporary political discourse disproportionately primes issues related to the “culture war,” leaving conflict between the political left and right anchored more in sociocultural concerns than in class-related economic concerns (see Frank, 2004; Layman, 2001). Thus, in terms of the psychological model advanced here, contemporary political conservatism would appear to be more closely linked to the “openness to change versus conservatism” dimension asso-
associated with anxiety than to the “self-transcendence versus self-enhancement” dimension associated with avoidance.

Our results raise two important questions, one about the nature and origins of political ideology, the other about the relevance of attachment processes for social and political life. If, as theorists have long maintained, political conservatism is motivated by a variety of epistemic and existential needs (see Jost et al., 2003, for a recent statement), it becomes crucially important to understand the psychological processes that give rise to individual differences in the strength of those needs. Unfortunately, most research is either silent on this etiological issue (e.g., McClosky, 1958; Wilson, 1973) or simply focuses on the role of generalized individual differences in threat sensitivity and attitudes toward uncertainty (Jost et al., 2003). Duckitt (2001) goes further in suggesting that different socialization experiences—involving either strict or unaffectionate parenting—give rise to independent sets of processes leading ultimately to the ideological dimensions represented by RWA and SDO. We believe that by applying the theoretical apparatus of attachment theory, we enrich the psychological understanding of how childhood (and adult) interpersonal experiences lead to individual differences in the strength and quality of epistemic and existential needs that presumably motivate political conservatism. In particular, our data suggest that working models of anxious and avoidant attachment heighten the individual’s concern about danger and competition, respectively, which are regulated by the adoption of ideological beliefs related to either social conformity (RWA) or social dominance (SDO). In doing so, our model allows political psychologists to go beyond a one-dimensional focus on the consequences of generalized threat and make sense of how different types of aversive relational concerns—linked to anxiety and avoidance—may give rise to conservatism.

At the other end of the spectrum, our results imply that individuals scoring low on anxiety and avoidance—the securely attached—are comparatively less likely to view the world as competitive and dangerous. Successful attachment episodes appear to give rise to general beliefs that the world is a harmonious place, reducing the need to adopt authoritarian or dominance-oriented postures. Ultimately, secure attachment should promote the endorsement of political liberalism, and our results suggest that the differences between political liberals and conservatives are perhaps much deeper than mere disagreements about the appropriate role of government. According to our model, ideological beliefs and preferences serve—at least to some extent—the functional goal of regulating the emotional and cognitive consequences of qualitatively different types of attachment styles.

Finally, our results extend attachment theory beyond the realms of interpersonal and interpersonal phenomena. Nearly all work to date on adult attachment pertains to intrapersonal effects on coping with stressful events, the regulation of emotion and mental health, and interpersonal effects in the domain of close relationships. Yet the attachment system, as we have shown, is important in the process in which beliefs about the interpersonal world are translated to broader
beliefs about society and the political world. Thus, it is important to underscore that our work goes beyond examining the types of environments that promote worldviews (e.g., Duckitt, 2001) in demonstrating how attachment strategies, perhaps arising in these environments, are in turn used to adopt particular worldviews and ideology. As authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have been shown to be strong predictors of public opinion and voting behavior, it is likely that attachment processes also have large-scale societal effects. Our study tentatively suggests that the distribution of secure and insecure attachment styles may have nontrivial downstream consequences for electoral behavior and public policy.

While we believe these findings are highly informative, several features of our analysis point toward the need for additional research. First, given the cross-sectional nature of our data, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the exact causal ordering of the relationships between the variables in our model. Although we assume that general psychological orientations like anxiety and avoidance should be causally prior to worldviews and ideology—like other researchers in this area (e.g., Jost et al., 2003)—longitudinal data would provide a less-ambiguous pattern of support for this assumption. For example, panel data on all relevant constructs would allow us to examine the strength of competing causal patterns using a cross-lagged design (Finkel, 1995). Similarly, actual developmental data might allow us to see whether attachment patterns early in life are predictive of different worldviews and ideologies later on.

Second, as our last round of analyses indicate, the “anxious” pathway involving dangerous-world perceptions and RWA is more strongly linked to left-right self-placement than the “avoidant” pathway involving competitive-jungle perceptions and SDO. While this pattern is consistent with perspectives emphasizing the role of “culture war” issues in contemporary ideological conflict (e.g., Frank, 2004), it is worth asking whether there are variables that might modify this pattern. For example, to the extent that cultural polarization is a product of elite attention to culture war issues (e.g., Layman & Carsey, 2002), then we might expect the relative effect of the two pathways to flip if greater elite attention were paid to economic issues. Moreover, concern about social issues may be primarily concentrated among well-educated, relatively well-off individuals (such as the college students in the present study; see Frank, 2004; Layman, 2001). If this is the case, we might expect the relative strength of the anxiety-related dimension to be reduced in populations that are lower in education or income. These issues—and others—await further investigation.

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Brook Political Psychology Brown Bag meetings, and the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on how to improve the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 meeting for the International Society of Political Psychology in Lund, Sweden. Correspondence may be addressed to Christopher Weber, Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794. E-mail: crweber@notes.cc.sunysb.edu

REFERENCES


### Appendix

#### Covariance Matrix for Latent-Variable Indicators

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Interpersonal Attachment Items (Odd numbers are avoidant items, even numbers are anxiety items)

1. I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down.
2. I worry about being abandoned.
3. I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners.
4. I worry a lot about my relationships.
5. Just when my partner starts to get close to me I find myself pulling away.
6. I worry that romantic partners won’t care about me as much as I care about them.
7. I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close.
8. I worry a fair amount about losing my partner.
9. I don’t feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners.
10. I often wish that my partner’s feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for him/her.
11. I want to get close to my partner, but I keep pulling back.
12. I often want to merge completely with romantic partners, and this sometimes scares them away.
13. I am nervous when partners get too close to me.
15. I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner.
16. My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away.
17. I try to avoid getting too close to my partner.
18. I need a lot of reassurance that I am loved by my partner.
19. I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner.
20. Sometimes I feel that I force my partners to show more feeling, more commitment.
21. I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on romantic partners.
22. I do not often worry about being abandoned.
23. I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners.
24. If I can’t get my partner to show interest in me, I get upset or angry.
25. I tell my partner just about everything.
26. I find that my partner(s) don’t want to get as close as I would like.
27. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner.
28. When I’m not involved in a relationship, I feel somewhat anxious and insecure.
29. I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners.
30. I get frustrated when my partner is not around as much as I would like.
31. I don’t mind asking romantic partners for comfort, advice, or help.
32. I get frustrated if romantic partners are not available when I need them.
33. It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need.
34. When romantic partners disapprove of me, I feel really bad about myself.
35. I turn to my partner for many things, including comfort and reassurance.
36. I resent it when my partner spends time away from me.
Note. Items 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 were included in anxiety parcel 1; items 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, and 24 were included in anxiety parcel 2; items 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, and 36 were included in anxiety parcel 3. In turn, Items 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 were included in avoidance parcel 1; items 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23 were included in avoidance parcel 2; items 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35 were included in avoidance parcel 3.

“Dangerous World” Items
1. Although it may appear that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn’t so. Every era has its problems, and a person’s chances of living a safe, untroubled life are better today than ever before.
2. Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All signs are pointing to it.
3. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all.
4. Despite what one hears about “crime on the street”, there probably isn’t any more now than there ever has been.
5. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; we do not live in a dangerous world.
6. Every day as society becomes more lawless and bestial, a person’s chances of being robbed, assaulted, and even murdered go up and up.
7. My knowledge and experiences tell me that the social world we live in is basically a safe, stable, and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good.
8. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else.
9. The “end” is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might be about to destroy the world are being foolish.
10. My knowledge and experience tell me that the social world we live in is basically a dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent, and moral people’s values and way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people.

Note. Items 1-3 were included in dangerous-world parcel 1; items 4-6 were included in dangerous-world parcel 2; items 7-10 were included in dangerous-world parcel 3.

“Competitive Jungle” Items
1. Winning is not the first thing; it’s the only thing.
2. The best way to lead a group under one’s supervision is to show them kindness, consideration, and treat them as fellow workers, not as inferiors.
3. If it’s necessary to be cold blooded and vengeful to reach one’s goals, then one should do it.
4. Life is not governed by the “survival of the fittest.” We should let compassion and moral laws be our guide.
5. Money, wealth, and luxury are what really count in life.
6. It is much more important in life to have integrity in your dealings with others than to have money and power.
7. It’s a dog eat dog world where you have to be ruthless at all times.
8. You know that most people are out to “screw” you; so you have to get them first when you get a chance.
9. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a “competitive jungle” in which the fittest survive and succeed; power, wealth, and winning are everything; and might is right.
10. One should give others the benefit of the doubt. Most people are trustworthy if you have faith in them.
11. We can make a society based on unselfish cooperation, sharing, and people generously helping each other, and not on competition and acquisitiveness.
12. If you have power in a situation, you should use it however you have to get your way.
13. It is better to be loved than to be feared.

**Note.** Items 1-4 were included in competitive-jungle parcel 1; items 5-8 were included in competitive-jungle parcel 2; items 9-13 were included in competitive-jungle parcel 3.

**RWA Items**

1. People should pay less attention to the bible and other old traditional forms of religious guidance and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.
2. It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a decent respectable appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially, a lady.
3. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.
4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
5. Rules about being “well mannered” and respectable are chains from the past, which we should question very thoroughly before accepting.
6. In these troubled times, laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up.
7. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.
8. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
9. The courts are right in being easy on drug users. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these.
10. A woman’s place should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

11. Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them.

12. Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much better care instead of so much punishment.

**Note.** Items 1, 5, 7, and 9 were included in RWA parcel 1; Items 2, 3, 10, and 12 were included in RWA parcel 2; Items 4, 6, 8, and 11 were included in RWA parcel 3.

**SDO Items**

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to others.

2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

3. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

4. Inferior groups should stay in their place.

5. Group equality should be our ideal.

6. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

7. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.

8. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.

**Note.** Items 1, 2, and 3 were included in SDO parcel 1; items 4, 5, and 6 were included in SDO parcel 2; items 7 and 8 were included in SDO parcel 3.