Mediterranean Historical Review

Ibn al-Lihyani: sultan of Tunis and would-be Christian convert (1311-18)
Michael Lower

* Department of History, University of Minnesota, USA

To cite this Article

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09518960903000744

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518960903000744

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Ibn al-Lihyani: sultan of Tunis and would-be Christian convert (1311–18)

Michael Lower*

Department of History, University of Minnesota, USA

The fifteenth century is often seen as a turning point in Iberian Christian relations with North Africa, with the crusading rhetoric of recovery, or \textit{recuperatio}, giving way after 1492 to the language of conquest and conversion, or \textit{dilatatio}. In this paper, I consider an earlier example of North African–Iberian relations that brought the \textit{dilatatio} theme to the fore. In this case, however, it was a Muslim prince who took the initiative. His name was Ibn al-Lihyani, and he seems to have understood the Christian urges of conquest and conversion well enough to turn them to his own advantage.

Keywords: North Africa; conversion; Tunis; crusade; Aragon

Norman Housley has observed a shift in crusading rhetoric in the western Mediterranean in the fifteenth century.\footnote{1} Prior to that time, crusades against Muslim Spain had traditionally been justified as wars of recovery, or \textit{recuperatio}. After 1492, as Spanish monarchs carried the war against the Muslims across the Straits of Gibraltar, the dominant goal became \textit{dilatatio}, ‘the expansion of the Christian faith through a linked programme of conquest and conversion’.\footnote{2} Although the shift from recovery to expansion in the fifteenth century was pronounced, there is an earlier history to the \textit{dilatatio} theme that is also worth exploring. Professor Housley himself has pointed to King Louis IX of France’s Tunis crusade of 1270 as an important precedent.\footnote{3} In this paper, I would like to consider another earlier example of North African–European relations that brought crusade and conversion to the fore. In this case, however, it was a Muslim prince who took the initiative. His name was Abu Yahya Zakariyya’ bin al-Lihyani, and he seems to have understood the Christian urges of crusade and conversion well enough to turn them to his own advantage.

Al-Lihyani seized control of Tunis in a bloodless coup in 1311. His rise to power was symptomatic of the strife-riven politics that had divided North Africa since the collapse of the Almohad Empire in the early thirteenth century. Taking the Almohads’ place were three successor states – the Hafsids of Tunisia, the Zayyanids of Algeria, and the Marinids of Morocco – which frequently fought one another for control of the Maghreb in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.\footnote{4} Initially, it appeared that the Hafsids would emerge as the strongest claimant to the Almohad legacy. Under the relatively united regimes of Abu Zakariyya’ (1228–49) and his son Muhammad abu ‘Abdullah al-Mustansir (1249–77), the Hafsids developed Tunisia into a Mediterranean commercial power.\footnote{5} Following al-Mustansir’s death, however, civil war broke out among his successors. By 1285 the Hafsids had split into two feuding branches, one ruling Tunis, the...
other Bougie (today Bijaya) to the west. Al-Lihyani was a child of this internecine strife: his uncle and father had both been executed as political rebels in earlier civil wars.

Al-Lihyani and his relatives were well positioned to play a central if dangerous role in Maghrebi political life. They were descended from a collateral branch of the Hafsid dynasty and belonged to the military aristocracy of the state. Members of this aristocracy claimed descent from the Berber tribes who had forged the Almohad Empire in the twelfth century. To advertise their distinguished pedigree, they too called themselves Almohads. Sultan Abu Zakariyya had seen these Hafsid Almohads as a source of stability for his regime. By the late thirteenth century, however, they were more often a cause of unrest, as they struggled to fight off challenges to their privileged position within the government from Andalusian refugees, Arab tribes, and Christian mercenaries.

At the head of the Hafsid Almohads was the ‘shaykh of the Almohads’, one of the great offices in the land. Al-Lihyani’s rise to prominence began when Sultan Abu ‘Asida of Tunis appointed him to this office in 1295, while placing him in charge of the army and foreign affairs at the same time. As de facto foreign minister, al-Lihyani developed relationships with Christian powers. In 1305, for example, he negotiated a commercial agreement with Venice on Abu ‘Asida’s behalf. He also maintained a friendly correspondence with King James II of Aragon. Their first diplomatic exchange involved the appointment of a new commander for the Catalan mercenary guard in Tunis. This was a delicate issue for two reasons. First, the guard occupied an ambiguous position in the Hafsid regime: it was a mainstay of the sultan’s army, but also a vehicle for projecting Aragonese power into North Africa, since its members were supposed to serve at the discretion of the King of Aragon. Second, there was already a guard commander serving in Tunis: Guillem Ramon de Moncada, a descendant of the man who had founded the guard in the 1250s. The problem was that James did not recognize Guillem as such. Abu ‘Asida delegated al-Lihyani to handle the matter. Although the discussions were prolonged, James eventually had his preferred candidate installed as commander.

Al-Lihyani worked closely with Aragonese officials again when he helped to negotiate a ten-year truce between Sultan Abu ‘Asida of Tunis and King James II of Aragon in November 1301. The truce had personal as well as political import for James. Earlier that year, a commercial vessel owned by the king, the Estancona, had run aground off Cape Bon. Local residents pillaged the ship and sold many of its crew into slavery. The Aragonese court estimated the loss, perhaps somewhat self-servingly, at 36,000 dinars. In a side agreement to the truce, al-Lihyani agreed to refund to James half the customs duties paid by Aragonese nationals in Tunis each year, until this enormous sum had been repaid. James was grateful for this favourable settlement. In a letter of 20 May 1302 to the ‘wise and discreet’ counsellor of the ‘noble king of Tunis’, James praised al-Lihyani for the ‘good will and strong affection’ he had shown him during the negotiations over the truce and the loss of the Estancona.

While al-Lihyani developed amicable relations with European rulers as foreign minister, his role as army commander demanded a more aggressive stance. In this capacity, he tried to cultivate a reputation for military leadership and piety. He succeeded more in the latter than the former. In 1306 he mounted an expedition to liberate Jerba from Christian control. The effort failed dismally, but rather than return to Tunis, al-Lihyani joined a caravan heading east on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Only his credulous chronicler al-Tijani, who would later serve in al-Lihyani’s government, seemed to believe his claim that completing the hajj had been his aim all along.

It proved to be a good time to fulfil a religious obligation. Sultan Abu ‘Asida died in 1309 and a succession struggle broke out in Tunis. The winner was Abu-l-Baqa’ of
Al-Lihyani returned from the east to find the new sultan overseeing a wave of political assassinations to consolidate his rule. From his base in Tripoli al-Lihyani rallied the disaffected leaders of the most powerful Arab tribes to his side. As they launched an assault on Tunis, al-Lihyani reached out to his European contacts. Soon three armed ships appeared in Tunis harbour. They belonged to Frederick III, the Aragonese king of Sicily, and they were under the command of Guillem Ramon de Moncada and Bernat de Fons. Guillem was the erstwhile commander of the Christian guard that James II of Aragon had tried to replace in 1301; Bernat was his second in command. Under pressure from within and without, Abu-l-Baqa signed a letter of abdication and retired. Al-Lihyani was installed as sultan on 14 November 1311.

Once in power, al-Lihyani nurtured a reputation for learning, piety, and respect for the law. While in the east he had met with the noted scholar Ibn Taymiyya, best remembered today as a theoretician of jihad. Although shaykh of the Almohads himself, al-Lihyani sought to reduce the influence of this group on public life by trimming its ranks of those who lacked a well-established tribal pedigree. Whether this helped al-Lihyani in the short term is doubtful; but it was part of a broader Hafsid effort over the fourteenth century to distance the dynasty from its Almohad roots and move closer to the increasingly popular Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence. The new sultan also demonstrated his obedience to the law in a more practical fashion. When his son was accused of murder, he surrendered him to the qadi (judge) without a murmur.

However, his grip on power was never strong. He had not been the only one to take advantage of Abu-l-Baqa’s divisive regime. Abu-l-Baqa’s younger brother, Abu Bakr, had exploited the chaos to seize control of Bougie in the spring of 1312. Just 18 years old at the time, he appears in the North African sources as the coming man of North African politics. Al-Lihyani was nobody’s idea of a coming man. He was 60 years old and beholden to the Arab tribal leaders who had backed his coup. His rule would be marked by caution and an aversion to armed conflict.

Al-Lihyani had two initial diplomatic goals. The first was to restore cordial relations with the Crown of Aragon after the disruptions of the previous decade. Shortly after taking office, al-Lihyani dispatched an embassy to Aragon. Perhaps remembering his attempt to drive them off Jerba, the Aragonese did not respond. In the meantime the new sultan pursued his second aim, which was to conciliate Abu Bakr. He told the young ruler of Bougie that he looked upon him as a son and a friend. He also offered sympathy, though little else, when Abu Bakr’s western border came under attack from the Zayyanids of Algeria.

Al-Lihyani was safe so long as Abu Bakr was preoccupied in the west, but it was crucial to gain allies ahead of his inevitable turn east. In the late winter of 1312, al-Lihyani requested a commercial treaty with Majorca. His proposal received an enthusiastic response from King Sancho, who wanted to establish a Majorcan consulate and funduq in Tunis, where Majorcan merchants had previously been required to operate under the aegis of the Crown of Aragon. Final terms were agreed in Tunis in January 1313. Such was Sancho’s eagerness to establish an independent Majorcan presence in Tunis, and such was the pressure that the Zayyanids were placing on Bougie, that al-Lihyani actually received better terms than Abu Bakr did in his truce of 23 November 1312 with the island kingdom. While Abu Bakr granted 15,000 gold dinars, payable over the 10-year term of the truce, to King Sancho, al-Lihyani agreed to no such provision.

Yet al-Lihyani’s position remained fundamentally weak. In November 1312 he wrote again to James II of Aragon, complaining about the lack of response to his previous embassy and about Catalan pirate attacks. When this letter also met with silence,
al-Lihyani decided to try something new. In January 1313 he sent Lorenç de Berga, the secretary of the Christian mercenary guard of Tunis, on a diplomatic mission to James of Aragon. Lorenç delivered a letter to James from al-Lihyani. In this letter, al-Lihyani requested a truce and urged James to give credence to everything that Lorenç had to say. This was especially important, al-Lihyani insisted, because Lorenç was to explain everything that was not made sufficiently clear in the text itself.38

What did Lorenç need to clarify? The answer came in a second letter that Lorenç delivered to James on al-Lihyani’s behalf.39 This letter was written by Bernat de Fons, the second in command of the Christian guard. Bernat was evidently not used to writing to kings. He introduced himself at the beginning – ‘I am Bernat de Fons, your humble servant’ – and explained that he was writing at the command of al-Lihyani. The sultan was eager for James to know that he had two brothers, and no more; James was one, and King Frederick III of Sicily was the other. There were in the world no two lords in whom he had such faith as these two. He was a Christian in his heart and wanted to die a Christian. He had confided as much to Guillem Ramon de Moncada, the head of the Christian guard, shortly after taking power in Tunis. He wanted to receive baptism and he hoped that James would tell the pope about his plans.

Bernat was uncertain about this last request. Before writing to James he had sought the advice of Frederick III of Sicily, a long-time thorn in the papacy’s side. Frederick in turn asked another papal enemy, Emperor Henry VII of Germany, for his opinion; and Henry replied that Pope Clement V should under no circumstances be informed, because he could not do anything without first telling the king of France. Frederick agreed that it would be better if King Philip IV ‘the Fair’ of France remained unaware of a situation that he might turn to the advantage of the Angevins.40 In the face of this high-powered advice, Bernat concluded that it might still be worth conciliating al-Lihyani on this point, provided that James could communicate the sultan’s wishes to the pope in utter secrecy. After all, Bernat explained, the potential reward was great:

if you, lord, want to believe me [he wrote to James] you may submit Tunis to your will. . . . You should know for certain, lord, that this current king [of Tunis] is a very benign lord and very gracious; many times he told me that his greatest wish in this world is that he could see you and the king of Sicily, because he says that the house of Tunis is yours.41

Al-Lihyani’s offer of conversion linked to political submission would have been enough to peak the interest of any northern Mediterranean monarch, even one as preoccupied by a multifaceted foreign policy as James II.42 The king’s efforts to settle the Aragonese–Angevin conflict were then in full swing; so too were his plans to conquer Sardinia and stabilize his position in Iberia, where his attempt to extend Aragonese power toward the Straits of Gibraltar had recently met with disaster. A grand alliance of Marinid Morocco, Castile, and Aragon against Granada in 1309 had resulted in a failed offensive that left Granada intact, the Marinids strengthened, and Castile and Aragon looking elsewhere to extend their influence.43 For James, the prospect of reorienting his efforts eastward, toward Tunis, might have appeared inviting.

Al-Lihyani had also chosen the right messengers to make his offer. This was not because they were in James’s good graces – far from it. The leading figures of the sultan’s Christian guard – Guillem Ramon de Moncada, Lorenç de Berga, and Bernat de Fons – had all fought on Frederick’s side against James when the Wars of the Vespers had pitted the brothers against each other in the late 1290s.44 Although they were the de facto leaders of the guard, James refused to recognize them as such.45 They were desperate to be restored to royal favour, and al-Lihyani’s conversion offered an opportunity. What more
could the king want than a major commercial centre that would allow the Catalans to dominate the Sicilian Straits?

James was now intrigued by al-Lihyani. In the summer of 1313 the king sent the veteran diplomat Guillem Oulomar to Tunis, armed with letters of credence, a polite but vague letter to al-Lihyani, and negotiating instructions. Guillem was to reassert James’s right to appoint the commanders of the Christian guard. The ambassador was also to claim for the Crown of Aragon one-fifth of the custom dues paid by its subjects to the Hafsids. Failing that, he was to insist, as a condition of making peace, on an annual payment of 5000 gold dinars for the duration of the truce. At the end of Guillem’s brief there appears a final additional instruction, written in Latin rather than Catalan:

If a certain secret business that is being conducted between the lord king of Aragon himself and the aforementioned king of Tunis… which could greatly concern divine service and all Christianity, should succeed, then the aforesaid Guillem may say in this case to the king of Tunis that the king of Tunis may arrange the aforesaid peace and all the above-mentioned articles as it pleases him and as he wishes.

Al-Lihyani, it seems, could have carte blanche if he converted to Christianity. Experienced as he was, Guillem Oulomar apparently found it hard to gauge the sultan’s true intentions toward conversion. Negotiations dragged on through the autumn of 1313 and into the winter of 1314. Finally, on 21 February 1314, the parties agreed to a ten-year truce. James attained neither of his main demands. No mention is made of the Christian guard, nor did he receive a share of the customs revenues. Later correspondence reveals, however, that al-Lihyani did agree to pay 2500 gold dinars for each year of the agreement, or half the amount the Aragonese had initially demanded. It is difficult to assess the effect of al-Lihyani’s spiritual revelations on these negotiations. On the one hand, he received less favourable terms from Aragon than his rival Abu Bakr of Bougie had obtained just six weeks earlier, in January 1314. Abu Bakr, who wanted Catalan naval support against the Zayyanids, had agreed to pay 1000 gold dinars annually for five years of peace. On the other hand, al-Lihyani was weaker in every way than Abu Bakr and he had not, after all, converted to Christianity. He may have been fortunate to have received any kind of truce with Aragon, let alone one that kept the Christian guard under his control and Catalan hands away from the customs house.

In fact, James II continued to pursue al-Lihyani’s conversion. In the summer of 1314 he wrote again to the sultan. The tone was understanding and sympathetic. James knew that the ‘secret business’ desired by God was taking a long time to come to fruition because covert affairs of that kind always required time and space to succeed. In the meantime, he urged al-Lihyani to acknowledge the sovereign grace that God had bestowed upon him and exhorted him to live in a fashion that suited the condition in which he currently found himself. In other words, if al-Lihyani was a Christian, he should act like one. James closed the letter by offering to help in any way possible, by promising to keep the sultan’s secret, and by asking him to destroy the letter once it had been read to him. On the same day, James wrote to al-Lihyani’s interpreter, the Catalan Johan Gil Pinton, asking him to instruct al-Lihyani in the faith and promising a reward if he brought the sultan around.

About a month later, the Catalan campaign for al-Lihyani’s soul reached its peak when Ramon Llull arrived in Tunis. It would prove to be his third and final mission to North Africa. On his first trip, to Tunis in 1292, Llull had preached publicly and been expelled on pain of death. On his second trip, to Bougie in 1307, he had preached publicly again, been arrested, imprisoned for six months, and then deported to Italy. This time Llull was able to operate freely in Tunis for a year, without interference from the authorities. His old disciple, the Franciscan Simon de Puigcerdà, soon arrived to help translate some of his
polemical treatises. A letter of recommendation on Llull’s behalf from James II to al-Lihyani may have helped to ensure this warm reception.

Taking advantage of this era of good feelings, al-Lihyani sought and was granted, in September 1314, a four-year extension of the truce signed the previous February. The peace he enjoyed with the Crown of Aragon, however, was more fragile than the new agreement would suggest. James had encouraged al-Lihyani’s conversion in 1314. A year later, he was considering other ways of bringing Tunis under Christian control. After King Frederick III of Sicily and King Robert of Naples agreed to a truce in December 1314, James proposed a scheme for permanently resolving the Aragonese–Angevin conflict. Robert would vindicate Angevin claims to Sicily by taking it back from Frederick, and Frederick would receive Tunis in compensation; once, that is, a joint Aragonese–Angevin expedition had conquered it. Robert countered with a plan that would keep the Hafsids in power. In return for Sicily he would transfer his claim to the tribute that Tunis had traditionally paid to the ruler of the island to James II, who in return would cede his rights in Sardinia and Corsica to Frederick. While these negotiations continued, James toyed with the idea of a naval demonstration in the waters off Tunis to strengthen al-Lihyani’s resolve. This proposal was not far removed from what Louis IX is said to have done on his 1270 crusade. Once again, conversion and crusade were working hand-in-hand in the plans of a European king.

While James II looked for ways to bring Tunis into the Aragonese fold, al-Lihyani was confronting a threat closer to home. In late 1315, Sultan Abu Bakr of Bougie defeated the Zayyanids with the help of a Catalan naval squadron. The alliance he had forged with Aragon the year before had more than proved its worth. The squadron cost the Catalans 12,000 gold dinars, which Abu Bakr, having seen off the Zayyanids, now refused to pay. In fact, the squadron had not even cost the sultan the annual payment of 1000 gold dinars he owed Aragon under the terms of their agreement. After some hard bargaining in the spring of 1315, the Aragonese had agreed to waive this payment in exchange for the release of 38 of their nationals from prison in Bougie – a high price to pay. However frustrated the Aragonese may have been with this turn of events, al-Lihyani had still greater cause for concern. Freed of the threat from the west, the sultan of Bougie launched his first attack into central Tunisia later that year.

More attacks followed in 1316, and the chronicler al-Zarkashi tells us that it was about this time that al-Lihyani began to dream of abdicating. He had come to admire Abu Bakr and saw his eventual ascension in Tunis as inevitable. Al-Lihyani began to plan for the next stage of his life. He gathered up all the precious items he could find in the royal palace and put them up for sale. Among the treasures was the famous library of Abu Zakariyya, the Hafsid founder, consisting of ‘all original manuscripts or fair copies, chosen with great care’, as Ibn Khaldun recounted in horror. By this expedient al-Lihyani raised, it was said, 2000 pounds of gold and enough large pearls and rubies to fill two large sacks. Then, in March 1317, he announced a tour of the provinces. The tour comprised a rapid retreat eastward, away from Bougie, to Gabès. When the leaders of the army he had left behind in Tunis told him that Abu Bakr was on the march, al-Lihyani replied, ‘You have money and troops; I approve everything you may do’. Upon hearing this, the soldiers released al-Lihyani’s son, imprisoned, we will recall, on the qadi’s orders, to take charge of the city’s defences. When al-Lihyani learned that the fighting was going badly for his son, he retreated further east, to Tripoli; and when his son was forced to withdraw to Mahdia in 1318, al-Lihyani boarded a ship sent by Frederick of Sicily and sailed for Alexandria. There he spent the last decade of his long life, showered with ‘riches and fiefs’, according to Ibn Khaldun.
Even as al-Lihyani liquidated the proceeds of his reign, his supporters across the sea clung to their dreams of conversion. In December 1316, as al-Lihyani was parcelling off the royal library to the finest booksellers in Tunis, James finally informed the papacy of the ‘secret business’ of Tunis. In a private meeting, Guillem Oulomar briefed the newly-installed John XXII.70 However, the pope was unhappy to be told of such a serious situation in such a furtive fashion. He said that he could not consider the matter until James II sent properly accredited envoys.71 John may also have been reluctant to embroil himself in a plan to extend Aragonese influence over Tunis. While James struggled to negotiate with the pope, Frederick of Sicily was devising a scheme to protect some of John XXII’s fiercest enemies, the Spiritual Franciscans. In May 1317 Frederick asked al-Lihyani if he could harbour them in Tunis, because he no longer dared to keep them in his own lands.72 By this time al-Lihyani was in Gabés and Abu Bakr was knocking on the gates of Tunis. The days of welcoming Franciscans in the Hafsid capital were over. For a time, though, a different kind of Muslim ruler had reigned there. With few resources at his disposal and little enthusiasm for warfare, he had nonetheless risen to the heights of power and lived to tell the tale, all the while maintaining that he was a Christian ‘in his heart’.73

Notes
1. I would like to thank Carol Hakim and Kevin Mummey for their help with this paper.
3. Ibid.
5. For the early Hafsids and their commercial orientation, see Brunschvig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides*, vol. 1, 1–70; Valérian, *Bougie*, 247–412.
12. In 1301 Guillem petitioned James II of Aragon to recognize his position. For the text, see Giménez Soler, ‘Caballeros’, 317–18.
13. This was Berenguer de Cardona: see Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane et le Maghrib*, 412, 418.
15. Dufourcq, ‘Documents inédits’, 262. This is a letter of 5 June 1301 from King James II of Aragon authorizing the diplomatic mission of Ramon de Vilanova to Tunis to regulate the matter.
29. Ibn Khaldun says that Abu Bakr had become formidable to other kings and al-Zarkashi comments that even al-Lihyani had come to admire his high qualities. See Ibn Khaldun, *Kitab al-‘Ibar*, vol. 6, 748; *Histoire des Berbères*, vol. 2, 446; al-Zarkashi, *Tarikh al-dawlatayn*, 131; *Chronique des Almohades et des Hafçides*, 93.
30. Al-Lihyani’s seizure of power rendered invalid the truce of 1301 between James II and Abu ‘Asida, which had been renewed in 1308. For the 1308 agreement, see Alarcón y Santón and Linares, *Documentos árabes diplomáticos*, no. 124: 277–8. This is a letter of 21 August from Abu ‘Asida to James II acknowledging the truce; the text of the truce does not survive.
31. In the face of Aragonese opposition, Majorca also established its own consulate in Bougie in 1302: see Riera Melis, *La Corona de Aragón y el reino de Mallorca*, nos. 35: 299; 38: 301–2; 39: 302.
36. Ibid.
37. In his letter of 31 January 1313, Bernat de Fons defended himself from this charge with the claim that he had never been ‘a rebel’ against James: Masiá de Ros, *La Corona de Aragón y los estados del norte de África*, no. 183: 487.
40. Very important for the wider political context of James’s diplomacy is Abulafia, *Western Mediterranean Kingdoms*, 107–32. See also Vera Izquierdo, ‘Relaciones políticas y comerciales de Jaime II de Aragón’, 493–500.
43. In his letter of 31 January 1313, Bernat de Fons defended himself from this charge with the claim that he had never been ‘a rebel’ against James: Masiá de Ros, *La Corona de Aragón y los estados del norte de África*, no. 186: 490–2. Guillem Ramon de Moncada would later argue that if he had fought against James, it was only because Frederick had once forced him onto a boat before a naval battle. Guillem offered this excuse in an appeal for pardon of 31 October 1301. For the text, see Giménez Soler, ‘Caballeros’, 317–18.


60. Mas Latrie, *Traité des paix*, 310–11. In this letter, which provides evidence for the naval battle, municipal magistrates from Barcelona charge Bernat Benecasa, the Aragonese consul at Bougie, with the task of seeking restitution for the expenses of the fleet from Abu Bakr.

61. The Catalans, Abu Bakr claimed, had acted out of friendship against a common enemy and should have been content with the spoils they had taken in battle. Giménez Soler, ‘Documentos de Túnez’, no. 20: 238, 240; Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane et le Maghrib*, 503.

62. The 1000 gold dinars Abu Bakr had agreed to pay annually to Aragon were supposed to have come from half the proceeds of customs duties paid by Aragonese subjects in Bougie. See Mas Latrie, *Traité des paix*, 304–6 (article sixteen by Mas Latrie’s numbering). In August 1314, the sultan proposed instead that the required sum be raised on a quarter of these revenues and dispatched an embassy to Barcelona to plead his case. For the embassy, see Giménez Soler, ‘Documentos de Túnez’, no. 17: 233–6.


68. al-Zarkashi, *Tarikh al-dawlatayn*, 132; *Chronique des Almohades et des Hafçides*, 94.


70. Guillem reported back to James on 12 January 1317 that the pope was very interested in the matter: Finke, *Acta Aragonensia*, vol. 2, no. 492: 787–8.


72. We know of Frederick’s request from a diplomatic report sent by Fernandes de Ixar to James II of Aragon: Finke, *Acta Aragonensia*, vol. 2, no. 423: 671–2.

73. Masia de Ros, *La corona de Aragón y el norte de África*, no. 186: 490–2.

**Notes on contributor**

Michael Lower is Associate Professor of History at the University of Minnesota. He received his PhD from Cambridge University in 1999 and is the author of *The Barons’ Crusade: A Call to Arms and its Consequences* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). He was a residential fellow at the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2007 and will hold a Mellon Foundation New Directions Fellowship in 2010–11. He is currently working on a comparative history of Christian mercenaries in North Africa and Muslim mercenaries in Spain in the medieval and early modern periods, tentatively titled *Fighting for the Enemy*.

**Bibliography**


Masiá de Ros, Ángeles. La Corona de Aragón y los estados del norte de África: Política de Jaime II y Alfonso IV en Egipto, Ifriquiya y Tremecén. Barcelona: Instituto español de estudios mediterráneos, 1951.


