

physics and chemistry (aesthetics), biology (psychology), and sociology (ethics).

4. See part 3, "The Territory of the Historian," in Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Histories: French Constructions of the Past*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer et al. (New York, 1995). See also Ranajit Guha, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," in Guha and Gayatri Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York, 1988), 345–88; orig. pub. as Ranajit Guha, "The Prose

of Counter-Insurgency," *Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (1983), 1–42.

5. Jean-François Lyotard, *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime* (Stanford, 1994), 133.

6. I use this word as the working title of my next book, on built infrastructures and theories of wealth in the history of modernity: "ParaArchitectures: TransNational HaHAs and Other Archaeologies of Capital."

Social Theory of Space:

Architecture and the Production of Self, Culture, and Society

JOHN ARCHER
University of Minnesota

In 1989, geographer Edward Soja contended that, for at least a century, time and history had been privileged over space in the conduct of Western social science.¹ While Soja's position may have been overstated, it formally recognized intensifying attention to the critical role of space in the conduct of society itself. In architectural history, too, there has been a growing recognition of the instrumentality of built space (buildings, cities, landscapes) in such diverse facets of human life as cognition, selfhood, social and ideological relations, economy, politics, and power. Inquiries into that complex instrumentality of built space have been ongoing in many disciplines since the beginning of the twentieth century, with consequences that have become critical to the pursuit and understanding of architectural history. This essay represents a sampling of some of the more influential strands of those inquiries.

The role of the physical, material environment in articulating human consciousness, and thus in making meaning, was a critical factor in the work of both Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.² For these phenomenologists, who were concerned with the manner in which the human body was in its own right productive of space, a crucial matter was the process by which the specific material fabric of space structured bodily orientation and human consciousness. Martin Heidegger, in his discussion of building as a process of gathering and presencing, explored the opportunity that architecture afforded people to *dwell*—with considerable spiritual, metaphysical, and corporeal importance being attendant on that word.³ Complementary efforts by pragmatists such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have extended further the understanding of built space (and its relation to the body) as a fundamental instrument in the articulation of consciousness, understanding, and identity.⁴

Empirical analysis of the instrumentality of built space in

human belief systems was central to the work of Émile Durkheim, who in analyzing the physical spaces of Australian and Native American cultures demarcated the role of those spaces in the articulation of social relations (such as in clans), consciousness, and cosmology.⁵ Durkheim's work set the stage for much structuralist analysis to follow, an approach that—unlike the phenomenologists' insistence that space is *produced* by the person—constantly contended with the danger of determinism, that is, understanding specific material environments as capable of inculcating specific beliefs and practices. Michel Foucault offered a partial, and highly influential, corrective to this problem in his analysis of buildings not as instruments of consciousness or as prescriptive of social relations, but rather as capable of deploying power. Exploring the manner in which specific building types and designs both afford and deny specific practices, Foucault underscored the instrumentality of material form in the transmission of regimes of power: built space became an apparatus for fashioning ranks and roles of people in society.⁶

Foucault did not entirely resolve the determinist dilemma. From a Foucauldian perspective, regimes of power, as materialized in built space, primarily articulate the *relations* that govern the people who inhabit that space; they do not prescribe personal consciousness or identity (although these surely are shaped and influenced by the relations of power that obtain). Nevertheless, Foucault's account affords scant room for personal agency in the face of the extent and durability of the architectural apparatus. Change is possible, but only over considerable spans of time and/or on a revolutionary scale. In contrast, Allen Feldman has shown in his study of resisters incarcerated by the British in Northern Ireland that the most rigid of architectural confines do not erase agency, and in fact afford opportunity to further political ends.⁷

Another poststructuralist seeking to understand how space both serves and informs human consciousness, practice, and society, Pierre Bourdieu approached the problem with a more complex methodology. He not only undertook ethnographic analysis of correspondences between built space and social practices and beliefs (a methodology long common among structuralists), but also sought a more sophisticated theorization of the process by which those correspondences came to be sustained in the interests of individuals as well as the larger society. To this end, Bourdieu offered the notion of the *habitus*, a set of personally held dispositions around which a person's thought and activities are structured. Among other things, the *habitus* encompasses two complementary relations between the self and built space: first, spatial form as an apparatus through which people establish identity and articulate social relations; and second, the enduring capacity of buildings to sustain, protect, and perpetuate those identities and social relations. More specifically, the *habitus* is each person's set of cognitive and motivating structures, according to which that person fashions knowledge and initiates activity, not least in regard to relations between self and built space. Since these relations are predicated on particular configurations of built space (for example, a certain room or building type may be reserved for a specific class or gender; a building's orientation may conform to a given cosmology), one's dispositions are inextricably anchored there. Thus built space becomes the reference system within which knowledge is produced and applied, the physical forms according to which people establish and discipline their lives. Built spaces both "shape the dispositions constituting social identity" and naturalize those dispositions within society.⁸

Bourdieu's approach affords the architectural historian a fertile theorization of the often subtle and intimate relations that obtain between the built environment and human existence: how such things as type, orientation, plan, volume, scale, enclosure, light, color, and pattern first articulate, and then sustain, such dimensions of human life as consciousness, identity, occupation, status, gender, wealth, class, caste, and religion. Within a given social context one's *habitus*—the set of dispositions that one may hold individually or in common with members of various groups and strata—is reinforced by recognizing the potentialities and limits in the built environment that engage those dispositions. Built environment and *habitus* mutually sustain each other, but neither has absolute control over the other. Changing circumstances (such as evolving technology, or the intrusion of new political or economic forces) may, for example, undermine the relations sustained by a given set of buildings, thus occasioning either alterations to the build-

ings to suit the new circumstances, or revision of the *habitus* to suit new conditions. Agency remains very possible, yet the *habitus* is durable: the presumption remains that change will not occur unless there is a change in circumstances, or unless the *habitus* is poorly matched to the environment to begin with.

The specific role of built space in sustaining (and evolving) the economic apparatus, especially its role in the accumulation of capital and thus in the production of class relations, has been the sustained focus of Marxist geographers, such as David Harvey, who has addressed multiple dimensions of the urban fabric in his analysis. These range from its use as a symbolic and material implement for the demarcation of class and the (re)production of capital, to its potential as a site of resistance.⁹ Still, the analysis of buildings per se often has been among the weaker aspects of Marxist studies, in part because of the imperative to address broad-scale relations of class and capital. Here and across the social sciences, the term "space" frequently becomes dissociated from material structures and their analysis, referring instead to the general nexus of social relations. In spite of such considerations, the work of Henri Lefebvre stands out. Seeking to evolve a Marxist approach adapted to the shifting nature of capitalism itself, he explored both historically and analytically the role of space in shaping and sustaining human society. He argued that by *producing* space through design and daily practice, humans implement the imperatives of economy and ideology; as these imperatives evolve over time, so does the fundamental nature of the space that humans produce. Lefebvre also explored the modes by which people articulate the terms in which space is understood and lived. Thus in analyzing "representational space," that is, "space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate," he not only construed space as a functional apparatus that is necessarily engaged in systems of meaning, but also proposed those systems of meaning as establishing its very functions.¹⁰

One of the principal stages that Lefebvre identified in the historical evolution of space was "differential space," a stage that he described in terms of a Hegelian dialectic. "Differential space" would be possible, and obtain, after the contradictions of modernist-Enlightenment-capitalist space resulted in the demise of the present mode of spatial relations. But particulars of such differential space, or of the play of difference within it, are scarce in Lefebvre's writing. They are found more readily in writings on gender and race in space. Feminist social history and geography have explored not only the manner in which space is differentially gendered (see, for example, the work of Elizabeth Wilson and Gillian Rose¹¹), but perhaps more importantly

have addressed the differential nature of space according to who is inhabiting it when. Such an understanding of space as contingent, stressing “the construction of specificity through interrelations,” is central to the work of Doreen Massey.¹² Instead of understanding space as defined by discrete objects and boundaries, her approach opens the door to recognizing the differing ways in which people varying in gender, age, class, and race apprehend a given site or locale, the distinct histories that each of them brings to it, and thus the different purposes and significances that a given locale may have.¹³ In a complementary way, bell hooks, in her discussions of homeplace and marginality, has delineated both the manner in which black women can utilize certain spaces to realize a specific social role and identity, and the manner in which a given space affords differential identities, depending on the race of the inhabitant.¹⁴

Finally, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari offer a theoretical meta-apparatus for the understanding of space that, because its standpoint is distanced from the immediate context of late-capitalist society (the chapter title ties the discussion to the year 1440), presents space as a fundamental dimension for understanding the evolution and purposes of society. They divide space into two types, “smooth” and “striated,” which commonly intersect, and revert over time to each other. Smooth spaces are undifferentiated, like the desert, or nomad space; striated spaces incorporate the necessary differentiations that are instrumental to society, such as borders, property lines, and streets—all “striations.” As much as any of the authors cited above, Deleuze and Guattari confront the nature of space itself: striations, while necessary for society, also may bound and disadvantage its citizens; and smooth space, although it can be liberatory, will not “suffice to save us.” The challenge is to understand human life as a necessary series of transformations, or oscillations: “forces at work within space continually striate it,” yet the space where this occurs also “develops other forces and emits new smooth spaces.” Thus space sustains a process where “life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new paces, switches adversaries.”¹⁵

Even in the context of these various approaches to the study of space, and others not possible to include here, architectural history still is very much about buildings, their infrastructure, their designers, their patrons, construction techniques, types, styles, and the host of considerations that have informed the discipline for many decades. Yet for at least a century, inquiries into spatial theory also have developed a range of additional concerns that pull the study of architecture more broadly into the analysis of human life, consciousness, and society. The history of

architecture is thus strengthened and expanded by attention to concerns such as those identified here: the contingency of human consciousness and identity on the configuration of the built environment, the capacity of built space to sustain (or confront) belief, the articulation of human difference (or its suppression, or its negation) in concert with the terms in which space is produced, and the role of architecture in the furtherance of economy, power, and community.

Still, architectural history has the potential to engage more fully in the historical and critical analysis of the cultures in which the objects of its study reside, indeed in advancing the understanding of architecture as an integral component of human existence—personal, social, spiritual, and metaphysical. Much work in architectural history has addressed buildings as only the passive handmaidens of other interests and forces in society. A given building may be analyzed only as a “reflection” of certain political interests, economic imperatives, or personal ambitions, suggesting a practically inert presence. Yet the social theory of space demonstrates that buildings are at very least the *medium* and the *instruments* that give presence and purchase to the broad range of human interests. This affords a set of new opportunities for the architectural historian, in the form of questions that draw closer to a critical understanding of what architecture is. How do buildings (and their designers) fashion the very terms in which society will negotiate its complex interests? How does architecture engage (not merely “reflect”) the conflicts and challenges of its time? How, why, and when does architecture transform the landscape of social relations, as through the introduction of new building types or modalities? In other words, how do architects, designers, and builders take an active, critical role in shaping the parameters of the cultures in which they live, and those to follow? How, for example, do new building types transform (not “reflect”) ideology, politics, economy, or selfhood? As social theorists of space have shown, these are difficult and complex questions; yet as those same social theorists demonstrate, these are questions that can energize and transform much of the discourse of architectural history. Finally, this is not necessarily a call to undertake more *theory* per se; in many respects, social theorists have laid promising groundwork for us. Rather, it is to propose that the investigations of architectural historians, if informed by these theoretical stances while closely engaged with the material fabric and historical context, working with specific structures in specific places, can further considerably a critical understanding of the terms and conditions in which human culture and society are conducted.

Notes

1. Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies* (London, 1989), 1.
2. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (The Hague, 1954) (published posthumously); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris, 1945).
3. Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951), in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1971). See also Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas (1957; Boston, 1969), and Christian Norberg-Schulz, *The Concept of Dwelling* (New York, 1985).
4. George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago, 1987), and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York, 1999). See also Richard Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics* (Oxford, 1992).
5. Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Karen E. Fields (1912; New York, 1995); Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, *Primitive Classification*, trans. and ed. Rodney Needham (1903; Chicago, 1963).
6. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (1975; New York, 1979).
7. Allen Feldman, *Formations of Violence* (Chicago, 1991). See also Nancy Fraser's discussion of the notion of "counterpublics" in "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in Bruce Robbins, ed., *The Phantom Public Sphere* (Minneapolis, 1993), 1–32.
8. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (1980; Stanford, 1990), 71. See also Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (1972; Cambridge, England, 1977).
9. Representative of David Harvey's work are *The Urban Experience* (Baltimore, 1989), and *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford, 1989). See also Mike Davis, *City of Quartz* (London, 1990), which although not overtly Marxist is likewise critically engaged with the urban fabric.
10. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford, 1991), 39.
11. Elizabeth Wilson, *The Sphinx in the City* (Berkeley, 1991), and Gillian Rose, *Feminism and Geography* (Minneapolis, 1993).
12. Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis, 1994), 7.
13. For another theorization of spatial difference, see Michel Foucault's discussion of heterotopia in "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16 (spring 1986), 22–27. See also what several authors have termed "third space": Homi Bhabha, "The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha," in Jonathan Rutherford, *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (London, 1990), 207–21; Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and Paul Routledge, "The Third Space as Critical Engagement," *Antipode* 28, no. 4 (1996), 399–419.
14. bell hooks, *Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics* (Boston, 1990), chs. 5, 15.
15. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "1440: The Smooth and the Striated," in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, 1987), 500.

Sociology: Bourdieu's Bequest

HÉLÈNE LIPSTADT

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1931–2002), creator of the "theory of practice," was a practical man.¹ He aspired to enable intellectuals and ordinary people to change their practices and he succeeded in doing so. His sociology of higher education propelled French students to mount very real barricades in May 1968, and his sociology of museums and art appreciation inspired curators and artists to assault the metaphoric ones erected by the Kantian notions of the universally and immediately accessible work of art. Readers of the *JSAH* have encountered his signature concepts of fields, capitals, and *habitus*, and have seen reproductions of his photographs.² They may not, however, be aware of the ways that Bourdieu's sociology enables us to overcome the disciplinary limitations of architectural history, a vestige of its origins in formalist art history, while strengthening its distinctive autonomy, that is, the way it enables us to dismantle our own barricades, and, to use Bourdieu's oft-repeated formula, to find our own object.

The particular qualities of the object we study when compared to other cultural products is so obvious to us, and so taken for granted, that they bear reconsidering. Archi-

ture is differentiated from other disciplines by two factors: by its collective nature—it is cooperatively and competitively enabled, designed, executed, marketed, and modified—and by the fact that the client is essential to its realization as construction. While any claim to authorship is thus at best problematic, architecture nonetheless requires the allocation of a kind of power to architects that few artists are ever accorded. Aided by the core notions of Bourdieu's *sociology of the field of cultural production* (whose terms are hereafter italicized), we can learn how to translate architecture's specificity into disciplinary autonomy for architectural history.

Let me first sketch Bourdieu's system for analyzing the overlapping and competing elements, called *fields*, that constitute society, or social space. A field is a *universe of social relations* constituted by the members of the field in accordance with their own *habitus*, *logic*, *stakes*, *capitals*, and *interests*. The *habitus* is a *system of dispositions* shaped by *history* (of individuals and of groups, thus of their experience of society, or *social space*, which is structured), which generates actions that shape the social world, so that the *structured* and the *structuring* are