



## The U.S.-Shi'ite Relationship in a New Iraq: Better than the British?

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"Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.... It is [not] the wish of [our] government to impose upon you alien institutions."

- British General Frederick Stanley Maude, Baghdad, 1917

### Ominous Times

Despite the monumental events of the last year, Iraqi Shi'ites<sup>[2]</sup> see continuity in the political culture of Iraq. U.S. actions are viewed through the prism of a century of disenfranchisement and oppression, much of which can be attributed to the decisions of past colonizers. Nevertheless, there is every indication that Iraqi Shi'ites are going to fight to try and transform the political landscape; it may be their last chance in this generation to regain what they feel is their rightful place in Mesopotamia.

Iraq is facing a future less certain than at any time in its history—a future that will begin on June 30 when the Coalition Provisional Government ceases to exist and a new temporary governmental entity comes into being. There are some ominous signs that this transition has been extremely ill-conceived, and is likely to lead to more violence and breakdown. At this writing in late April 2004, the U.S. government is telling the world that Iraq will be granted sovereignty, but we now realize that the United States will not relinquish control of the military to the next provisional government. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman called this "limited sovereignty" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 22. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, testifying before the same committee, also said that the new government was basically there to set up elections in January 2005.

In the eyes of Iraqis, and particularly the Shi'ites, who view events with cultural memory, the current "culture" is the same one that has pervaded for more than seventy years. Today's events seem like those of the earliest days of Iraq's existence.<sup>[3]</sup> Here it is important to make a clear distinction between what one might call "scientific history," dealing in objective causal explanation for events, and "cultural memory," in which events are "remembered" in a way that creates causal links between the present and the past, whether these memories are accurate or not. When they are widely believed, such memories have the force of fact, and can be strong motivators for public action.

### A Replay of Colonial Patterns

Gertrude Bell and her superior in the administration of British rule in Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, were charged with creating a nation out of whole cloth that would serve British colonial interests.<sup>[4]</sup> They did their job well. They created a Kurdish buffer against Turkey in the north under their control, rather than as an independent state. They installed favored Sunni rulers in Baghdad, with a Hashemite King, Emir Feisal of Mecca, at the head. Most importantly, they institutionalized repression of the Shi'ites in the South. The British governance of Iraq was, according to historian Charles Tripp, a combination of "direct and indirect rule."<sup>[5]</sup> This sounds suspiciously like Grossman's "limited sovereignty." If American's don't know their history, Iraqis definitely have a strong sense of theirs, and they see the United States as directly continuing the policies of Great Britain. The British ruled under a Mandate from the League of Nations. The United States, too, has claimed a larger authority as justification for its rule in Iraq. Saddam Hussein's violation of UN resolutions has been used by the Bush administration as a mandate for both the American invasion and subsequent rule. The Iraqis read the American "mandate" as the equivalent of the British Mandate. It is also seen as just as illegitimate.

It should be obvious that the Iraqis are now revolting against the United States in a manner similar to the way that they revolted against Great Britain in 1920 and again in 1958, when the British were removed once and for all. The circumstances behind the revolt of 1920 and the revolution of 1958 are vastly different, but all three events stem broadly from a desire on the part of the Iraqis to strike out at what they see as oppression by an unwelcome outside power.

Charles Tripp writes that the Revolt of 1920 "began in Baghdad with mass demonstrations of urban Iraqis, both Sunni and Shi'ite, and the protests of embittered ex-Ottoman officers. The revolt gained momentum when it spread to the largely Shi'ite regions of the middle and lower Euphrates. Well-armed tribesmen, outraged by the intrusions of central government and resentful of infidel rule, seized control of most of the south of the country. It took the British several months, and cost thousands of lives—British, Indian and Iraqi—to suppress the revolt and re-establish Baghdad's control."<sup>[6]</sup>

The Revolt was the act that convinced the British that they needed to establish their puppet regime. Never mind that many Iraqis accepted Emir Feisal as king. His later rule and successors were seen as dominated by the British. If the United States now establishes its own puppet regime in Baghdad, the symbolic parallel with the British action after World War I will be complete, and nothing will be able to convince the skeptics in Iraq that the United States has any interest there except colonial domination.

### **Understanding Shi'ites**

Despite her superb knowledge of Persian and Arabic, Bell never really understood the Shi'ites. Indeed, she would be at home in the current administration, for she feared that if the Shi'ites had control in Iraq they would soon be demanding Islamic rule that would be anti-Western and anti-modern. The world had to wait for many years before the first sympathetic pictures of Shi'ites emerged. Wilfred Thesinger<sup>[7]</sup> and later Robert<sup>[8]</sup> and Elizabeth Fernea<sup>[9]</sup> finally painted authentic, detailed pictures of these southern denizens. No one reads them, however, and the persistent image of Shi'ites as wild-eyed fanatics continues to be promulgated by the press, and more importantly by the Bush administration.<sup>[10]</sup>

However, one fact has hit home, due largely to the hugely important influence of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of Najaf, whose opinions are followed by Iraqi Shi'a as if they were edicts from God. The Shi'ite community is likely to be the key to any stability or instability in the country and they have been waiting to assume what they consider their rightful place in the region for nearly a century. They are mad, they are frustrated, and once again, their colonial masters are trying to sideline them. Little wonder they are fighting back.

The U.S. government has apparently not the slightest appreciation about the nature or functioning of the Shi'ite community. It was clear from the very beginning that for Washington, a Shi'ite was a Shi'ite. Dating back to the Iran-Iraq war, the United States assumed that the Shi'ites in Iraq were natural allies of the Shi'ites in Iran. They learned that things were not so simplistic but the complexity of the Shi'ite world never filtered up to the White House—neither in Democratic nor Republican administrations.

This blind spot has led to the unwarranted assumption that if Shi'ites were to run a post-conflict Iraqi government, they would install an "Iranian-style theocracy" in Iraq, to quote Vice President Dick Cheney. Both Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have said repeatedly that the fundamentalist Shi'ites will be prevented from assuming power.

The Coalition Provisional Council was said to be "balanced" with twelve Shi'ites and thirteen others. However six of the twelve Shi'ites are émigrés with no support in the Shi'ite community. Even if a political figure is nominally a Shi'ite, he or she has to have some way to garner the loyalty of followers in the community. Confessional identity is never enough in and of itself. Ahmad Chalabi, who misled the United States repeatedly in planning for the invasion, and who has zero credibility with Iraqis, was touted as a future leader of Iraq in editorials in the Wall Street Journal by Bernard Lewis, this administration's apparent house "expert" on things Islamic.<sup>[11]</sup> One of Chalabi's supposed credentials was that he was a Shi'ite.<sup>[12]</sup>

However, the most serious error in transition to a new regime was the initial failure of U.S. administrators to take into account the spiritual leadership of the grand ayatollahs of Iraq. Their support will be crucial for any planned governmental action. This was proven when Sistani opposed American plans for governmental transition and the United States had to back down.

### **Shi'ite Rivalries**

The myth of the Shi'ite monolith still persists for most Americans on the ground in Iraq. Americans do not understand that the Shi'ite community is extremely diverse and complex. It predates, and therefore transcends national borders. Personal relationships between grand ayatollahs may seem cordial on the surface, particularly when they are institutionalized in "seminaries," known as *hawzat `ilmiyyah*, or "collegia of knowledge," but these relationships are fraught with rivalry.

Shi'a Islam differs from Sunni Islam in a number of historical and philosophical ways. However, one important difference is that Sunni Islam is organized into legal "schools." Shi'ism is dependant on individual personalities—*marja-e taqlid*. There is no formal clergy in Islam. Anyone, male or female, can study theology and whereas one may receive a "certificate" for having studied certain things, there is no official certification for the clergy. Technically, any Muslim can lead prayer or offer religious opinions.

The Shi'a system is based on consensus. When a person is known for their knowledge and wisdom, they are a *faqih* or "jurisprudent" (literally a person who practices *fiqh*, or "reason"). A very prominent *faqih* becomes known as a *mujtahid*, or "practitioner of exegesis," in short, such people are trusted to interpret Islamic law. When such person due to his (or her) superior personal qualities and knowledge becomes a focal point for persons to follow, and prominent religious persons endorse the views of that person, then the *mujtahid* becomes a *marja' al-taqlid*,<sup>[13]</sup> and to follow him in religious matters is called *taqlid*. Technically, a *marja' al-taqlid* is a "grand ayatollah" in common parlance.<sup>[14]</sup>

Ithna-Ashara Shi'ism, or "Twelver" Shi'ism is the dominant doctrine in Iran. Its name derives from the belief of its adherents in twelve Imams, who were leaders of the faithful, and direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. The twelfth imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, disappeared in

infancy. He is said to be in "occultation" until the end of the world. In the meantime, adherents to the Twelver Shi'a doctrine are technically without a present leader.

Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who at the time of the Iranian Revolution, was the *marja' al-taqlid* with the largest number of followers in the Twelver Shi'a world, introduced a completely new doctrine: the *Velayat-e Faqih* or "Regency of the Jurisprudent."<sup>[15]</sup> In this doctrine, the chief jurisprudent, the most prominent grand ayatollah, would rule over the faithful in the absence of the Twelfth Imam, thus becoming the supreme leader. Khomeini's doctrine was rejected by every other grand ayatollah. Traditionally Shi'a spiritual leaders had eschewed temporal power, and many felt that Khomeini's innovation was heretical. Nevertheless, his charisma and leadership skills were sufficient to convince the Iranian electorate to ratify a constitution granting the supreme leader unelected power over all aspects of government. Part of the reasoning was that the supreme leader was already acknowledged as such by the population by virtue of his knowledge, piety and personal character, and so did not need to be elected.

Sistani, arguably Iraq's most revered Shi'ite spiritual leader, gave an interview to the Arabic newspaper *Al Hayat* on April 18 through his son. Sistani's son spoke of "serious dangers that are directed at the religious figures, and even his eminence As-Sayyid al-Sistani." Georgetown University Middle East scholar Daniel Brumberg interprets this not as opposition to the United States, but to other Shi'ites who are trying to usurp Sistani's authority.

One of those Shi'ite rivals is Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the few surviving descendants of Grand Ayatollah Mohamed Bakr al-Sadr, who was executed on Saddam Hussein's orders in 1980. Muqtada al-Sadr is only 22, but is a firebrand.<sup>[16]</sup> Reporter Lara Marlowe of the *Ireland Times* quotes one Shi'ite in Baghdad: "The young people in Najaf follow Muqtada, but the older ayatollahs say he doesn't have enough knowledge."<sup>[17]</sup> Because Muqtada is not yet an ayatollah, one can see why Sistani would decry his attempts at leadership.

On April 21, 2003, U.S. troops arrested one of al-Sadr's lieutenants, Shaikh Muhammad al-Fartusi and two other clerics at a Baghdad checkpoint when they gathered a huge crowd of Shi'ites in Baghdad to denounce the United States at Friday prayers. Al-Fartusi said in his sermon that the United States could not impose a formal "democracy" on Iraq that allowed freedom of individual speech but denied Iraqis the ability to shape their own government. Al-Fartusi's arrest provoked a demonstration of five thousand Shi'ites in front of the Palestine Hotel. The gathering and the sermon were preparatory to a pilgrimage to the holy city of Karbala, site of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, grandson of the prophet Mohammad. This time of year, the holy month of Muharram, is the time for such pilgrimages, long suppressed by Saddam Hussein. Thus the arrest of al-Fartusi was read as suppression of Shi'ite religious practice by the U.S. Army. Al-Fartusi's arrest was also widely viewed as a backhanded attempt to weaken al-Sadr.

Continued attacks against Sadr over the last month reveal much about the nature of the Iraqi Shi'ite community. The attacks were most likely prompted by Ahmad Chalabi, who saw him as a threat to his own future rule of Iraq. The attack against al-Sadr's organization took place on April 3. On April 4, Bremer announced the new defense minister for the post-June 30 government, Ali Allawi, who is Chalabi's nephew. The coincidence is hard to dismiss.

When al-Sadr struck back with his al-Mahdi Army, the first accusation out of the gate was that he was "supported by Iran." The accusation came from neo-conservative Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, who until recently was an advisor to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority. Rubin laid out a baroque set of connections between Iran and al-Sadr. Rubin named Ayatollah Kazim al-Husayni al-Haeri, a cleric based in the Iranian shrine city of Qom, as a conduit of funding to Sadr. Predictably, the news headline became, "Iran supports al-Sadr rebellion!" Having briefed the Department of Defense on this implausible scenario, he also published it on April 6 in the *National Review*.<sup>[17]</sup> The cry was quickly taken up by conservative *New York Times* columnists William Safire and David Brooks, thus ensuring that this tenuous

connection would become common wisdom.<sup>[18]</sup> Finally, Rubin's American Enterprise Institute colleague, Michael Ledeen, took up the cry again in the *Wall Street Journal*.<sup>[19]</sup>

Rubin's story conflates personal and political connections with religious ones. In an interview in Qom on April 13, Hossein al-Haeri, younger brother of Ayatollah Haeri and a fellow cleric, said that while al-Sadr was his brother's "religious representative" in Iraq, they had no "political relationship." "My brother was a friend of Moqtada al-Sadr's father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr from the time they were classmates," he said. The elder al-Sadr was killed by Saddam Hussein in 1999. These kinds of clerical and family connections are legion in the Shi'ite world, where seminary students frequently maintain lifetime ties, even marrying into each other's families. The Daily Star of Beirut confirmed this on April 17 with an interview with Ayatollah al-Haeri. The spokesman said: "People thought that everything he said he got directly from Ayatollah Haeri. But we've said that's not true. As a result, the Sadr group doesn't have much of a relationship with the ayatollah anymore."<sup>[20]</sup>

It is worth mentioning that the murdered Shi'ite leader, Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim, who founded the Council of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (SCIRI) in 1982, was a recent arrival to Iraq. Like the other grand ayatollahs, Al-Hakim came from a respected Shi'ite clerical lineage. He lived in Iran in exile for twenty years, and has many followers in both Iran and Iraq. He was deeply worrisome to the Bush administration. When he returned to Iraq in September 2003, he was immediately killed at the al-Hussein mosque in the holy city of Najaf.

One of the more astounding events in the relationship between the United States and Iraq was a memorial service for Sheikh al-Hakim held at the Pentagon on September 27, 2003, in which Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz recited the *fatiha*,<sup>[21]</sup> and then went on to praise al-Hakim, saying, "His untimely death deprived Iraq of an important leader at a time when men like him are badly needed."<sup>[22]</sup> Since U.S. officials had been making ominous noises about Iranian influence in Iraq, and citing the existence of Sheikh al-Hakim as proof, it was an astonishing reversal to hear him praised in this way.

The U.S. administration fails to appreciate that Khomeini based his Islamic Republic on a religious doctrine that every other grand ayatollah considered heretical. It is for this reason that the Iranian form of government feared by Rumsfeld is anathema to Iraqi Shi'ites. Khomeini commandeered the Revolution of 1978-79, and became the author of the Islamic Republic because he had the most followers. He gained those followers by being the most outspoken critic of the Shah.

Despite the tenuous family ties between al-Sadr and Haeri, the Iranian clerics look with disapproval, if not downright condemnation, at the actions of al-Sadr. Were it not for the memory of his revered father, they would likely condemn him outright. The idea that they, much less official Iranian state institutions, would be supporting him financially is flatly illogical. Al-Sadr has no desire to be beholden to these senior clerics. His staunch Iraqi nationalism is one reason, and his view that they are all too quiescent puts him firmly in another political world.

In the meantime, the Bush administration, deeply worried about the escalating military engagement, resulting from the ill-advised attack against al-Sadr, was actually consulting Iran, trying to find ways to defuse the violence. Working through back-channel State Department contacts and the Swiss Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in Iran (there are no formal diplomatic relations), U.S. officials were consulting steadily with the Iranian foreign ministry. The United States hoped that the Iranians would be able to persuade more moderate clerics such as Sistani, himself an Iranian, to condemn al-Sadr, or mediate in the conflict. At the same time these talks were being held, Iranians were reading "experts" in American newspapers stating that they were to blame for al-Sadr's violence against the United States.

Predictably, the Iranians abandoned the talks on April 14. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi simply walked out, announcing that no progress was being made. "Previously, we had dialogue" about Iraq, Kharrazi stated. "Currently it has stopped because we felt we were going nowhere. The Americans give promises but don't keep their promises. Currently, they are taking a wrong path."<sup>[23]</sup>

In the end, the Iranians did send an unofficial delegation. They wanted to do this, of course, but they were not going to seem to do it at the request of the United States. Iraqis were so supportive of Iranian attempts to mediate that they killed an Iranian embassy official on his way to work.<sup>[24]</sup>

### **A Shi'ite Dominated Government**

What would a Shi'ite dominated government look like? Although it is difficult to tell in advance, a Shi'ite government might not at all be unworkable for the United States. The problem is, because no one has ever let the Shi'ites govern, they are an unknown quantity. The debates surrounding the Islamic Republic of Iran provide some clues. Most serious Shi'ite theologians believe in some kind of separation of religion and state. Even Khomeini first thought he would retire to Qom and render judgments on theological issues when asked. However, operating in violation of Islamic law, as interpreted by one or more ayatollahs, is blasphemous. Iran's solution was the very unworkable Council of Guardians that has virtually frozen the Iranian government and created enormous frustration. Iraqi Shi'ites don't want that; however, they also do not want to be disenfranchised by a foreign power like the United States, as has happened too often in their history. This was the basis for Sistani's objection to the Iraqi draft constitution that gave minorities substantial veto power.

We can expect that if left to their own devices, a Shi'ite dominated government would adopt models that it already knows. This would be a parliamentary system, probably with a religious judiciary. The judiciary might also serve as a religious council, which would be necessary to hammer out differences between different theologians about the nature and application of law.

They would have good relations with Iran, because Shi'ism does transcend national boundaries. Religious schools have important interconnections between faculty and students. Also, pilgrimage to Iraq is almost as important for Shi'ites as the pilgrimage to Mecca. However, they would not be dominated by Iran, but would pursue a separate political course.

### **No Better than the British**

From the perspective of Iraqi Shi'ites, the United States is neither better nor worse than the British seventy years ago. One would think that the situation would be improved today with all the hindsight at our disposal. The current Iraq crisis and the failed diplomatic interaction with Iran recapitulates almost every mistake the United States has made in Iraq since the beginning of the conflict. First the Bush administration listens to the wrong people. They take the wrong action, and then they try to blame someone else (like Iran) for their mistake. Finally they stand firm and repeat slogans to cover their ineffectiveness. Even when the people they try to blame are as denigrated as Iran, the world can see how pitifully weak both the actions and the excuses for these actions have become.

Ironically, this posturing is unnecessary. Treated with respect and understanding the Shi'ite community will cooperate with the construction of a new government. President Bush has taken to heart the advice that Arabs respect strength and despise weakness. This underlies much of his posturing of late. However, empty bluster and bravado only invites ridicule in the Arab world; it is not a sign of strength at all. Moreover, strength must be accompanied by other qualities—honor, mercy and the ability to reward one's loyal supporters. Sistani is one such "strong horse" of a true variety. Bush would do well to emulate his style.

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## References

1. An earlier version of this essay was presented to a conference on "Theocracy, Plutocracy and Democracy: The Middle East in Political Transition," co-hosted by the Center for Contemporary Conflict of the Naval Postgraduate School and the CNA Corporation (Alexandria, Virg.: April 23, 2004). Their sponsorship is gratefully acknowledged.
2. There is a great deal of variation in the appellations used for this community. Nakash uses Shi'ism as the term for the religious group, Shi'is as the term for adherents to the group, and Shi'i as an adjective, as in "Shi'i financial and intellectual institutions." (Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 7.) Juan Cole uses Shi'ism as the term for the religious group, Shi'ites as the term for the adherents and Shi'ite as an adjective as in "Shi'ite courts." (Juan Cole, *Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi'ite Islam*, 2002), p. 25). Other authors use all of these variations, as well as Shi'a as an adjective as in "Shi'a Muslims" or "the Shi'a." (see Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim Franke, *The Arab Shi'a: The Forgotten Muslims* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).) The term Shi'a means "partisan" and is shorthand for Shi'at 'Ali, or "partisans of Ali." The usages of Nakash and Fuller and Franke are closer to the original Arabic grammatical construction, but I have adopted Cole's slightly Anglicized usage in this paper adopting Shi'ite both as a noun and an adjective for simplicity's sake. Note that Nakash also modifies his usage in his 2003 article (Yitzhak Nakash, "The Shi'ites and the Future of Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (July-August 2003): pp. 17-26.)
3. See Eric J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge [UK]: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) for insights on this phenomenon.
4. In fact, Bell seems, by all accounts to have had primary administrative responsibility as "secretary" to the British administrator. She was a outstandingly brilliant scholar and a talented administrator, but, as mentioned below, she seems to have had a blind spot when it came to the Shi'ite clergy. See Civil Commissioner for Iraq, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, prepared by Arnold Talbot Wilson and Gertrude Lowthian Bell (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1920).
5. Charles Tripp, "Iraq: The Imperial Precedent," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January 2003.
6. Ibid.
7. Wilfred Thesiger, *The Marsh Arabs* (New York: Dutton, 1964); Thesiger, *Desert, Marsh, and Mountain: The World of a Nomad* (London: Collins, 1979).
8. Robert A. Fernea, *Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq*, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, no. 14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
9. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, *Guests of the Sheik* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970).
10. As mentioned above, more recent works, such as Juan Cole's *Sacred Space and Holy War*, Yitzhak Nakash's *The Shi'is of Iraq* and "The Shi'ites and the Future of Iraq" and Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke's *The Arab Shi'a*, have added greatly to our understanding of these complex people, and are required reading for anyone who intends to engage seriously with Iraq.

11. Bernard Lewis, "Put the Iraqis in Charge: Why Iraq is Proving Much Tougher than Afghanistan," *Wall Street Journal*, August 29, 2003.
12. Mr. Chalabi himself seems not to identify very closely with the Shi'ite community. In an interview with NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw for the Council on Foreign Relations on June 10, 2003 shows Mr. Chalabi speaking about the community as "they" rather than "we." "So I think the way to do it is to open up the political process in Iraq and have a strategy to deal with the Shia. After all, the Shia of Iraq are at least 65 percent of the population, and they are not in the main fundamentalist or inclined to have Iranians control Iraq. On the contrary, the Shia are patriotic Iraqis, they are Arabs, and Iraqis have control over their affairs within a democratic Iraq. ("A Conversation with Ahmed Chalabi," Council on Foreign Relations, June 10, 2003.)
13. In Persian this term conforms to Persian grammar and becomes *marja'-e taqlid*.
14. Cole, *Sacred Space and Holy War* and Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*.
15. This doctrine actually originated with Grand Ayatollah Mohamed Bakr al-Sadr, whose son, Muqtada is at this writing in combat with U.S. forces in Iraq.
16. According to some sources, he may actually be as old as 30 or even more. The appearance of Muqtada al-Sadr appears to have been a surprise to U.S. forces. In fact, he was a known quantity in Iraq even before the U.S. invasion. See William O. Beeman, "Losing the Peace in Iraq," *Open Spaces: Views from the Northwest* 6, no. 1 (2003): 36-44.
17. Michael Rubin, "Sadr Signs," *National Review Online*, April 6, 2004.
18. William Safire, "Two Frong Insurgency," *New York Times*, April 7, 2004, p. A19; David Brooks, "Take a Deep Breath," *New York Times*, April 10, 2004, p. A15.
19. Michael Ledeen, "The Iranian Hand: Regime Change in Tehran is Necessary for Peace in Iraq," *Wall Street Journal*, April 16, 2004.
20. Borzou Daragahi, "Sadr's Mentor Distances Self from Young Firebrand," *The Daily Star* [Beirut], April 17, 2004.
21. The most essential Islamic prayer, the principal component of every instance of the personal prayers that Muslims recite several times a day. Wolfowitz described as "a beautiful Muslim prayer that I learned while I was in Indonesia."
22. Paul Wolfowitz, "Remarks at Memorial Service for Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim," September 27, 2003.
22. "Iran Tells U.S. It Can't Solve Iraq Crisis without Neighbors," *Associated Press*, April 14, 2004.
23. "Iranian Envoy Killed in Iraq," *AlJazeera.Net*, April 15, 2004.